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I. INTRODUCTION
The modem academic trend, as embodied in the Uniform Probate Code
("UPC") and the new Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), has been to move from an
interventionist model of probate toward a minimalist approach to judicial
intervention.' That model may not be working when it comes to lawyers acting

* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Professor of
Law, Southwestern University School of Law; B.A., Yale University 1980; J.D.,
University of Virginia 1983. The Author would like to thank Christia Pritts for her
research assistance with this Article. She also would like to thank Marin Scordato, Jana
Singer, David Hyman, Richard Boldt, Joan O'Sullivan, Saul Levmore, Julie Roin, and
the Author's colleagues who participated in the University of Maryland School of Law
Faculty Workshop on this topic for their valuable insights and suggestions. Finally, the
Author would like to thank David English, the Editors ofthe MissouriLaw Review, and
the participants in the Uniform Trust Code Symposium for their very valuable comments,

as well.
1. In large part, this has been a response to legitimate concerns about cost, delay,
and corruption in the probate process on the part of the public and the profession. In
some part, it has been an effort to synthesize the probate and nonprobate methods of
wealth transmission upon death. See John H. Langbein, The NonprobateRevolution and
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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as fiduciaries. The ethical issues and monitoring problems inherent in the
confidential relationship that characterizes the attorney/client/fiduciary
relationship may warrant more, rather than less, intervention.2 These monitoring
problems and the underlying issues of conflict of interest are particularly acute
when the lawyer acting as fiduciary drafted the instrument in which he or she
was named. Traditional rules of fiduciary and agency law inform the
attorney/client relationship as a whole and become even more pertinent when
attorneys move from a general attorney/client relationship to a more "statutory"
fiduciary relationship with a client or his or her beneficiaries as executor or
trustee. This Article examines how those rules should inform a choice of
appropriate ethical models for drafting attorney/fiduciaries. 3
There have been a number of cases in the media during the past decade that
highlight the malfeasance of lawyers as executors and trustees. Lawyers are not
ethically forbidden from acting as fiduciaries nor are they subject to any greater
probate court scrutiny than laypeople when petitioning to be appointed as
fiduciaries. This is true in most states, even w.hen lawyers draft the instrument
in which they are named as executor or trustee. This Article raises a red flag as
to the revision of the ethical rules in this area proposed by the American Bar
Association's Ethics 2000 Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Ethics 2000") and approved by the ABA House of
Delegates. The Ethics 2000 revision states that the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules") do not prohibit a lawyer from seeking (which is
synonymous with "soliciting") 4 to have himself or herself named as executor of
the estate orto anotherpotentially lucrative fiduciary position.5 While othernew
language in the Ethics 2000 proposal is a welcome clarification as to the
the Futureofthe Law ofSuccession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108, 1115-25 (1984).
2. For a summary of these monitoring problems, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1126-30 (1981);
Elizabeth S. Scott& Robert E. Scott, Parentsas Fiduciaries,81 VA.L.REv. 2401,241820 (1995).

3. For a discussion of the similarity between the principles of fiduciary and agency
law with regard to fiduciary duties, see generally Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryDuties as
Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1242-51 (1995), which discusses limitations on
waivers ofrights to fiduciary duties, and Henry Hansmann &Ugo Mattei, The Functions
of Trust Law: A ComparativeLegal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.434,
449 n.42 (1998) (citing Victor Brudney, ContractandFiduciaryDuty in CorporateLaw,

38 B.C. L. REv. 595, 601-07 (1997), which discusses fiduciary obligations under trust
and agency law).
4. ROGET's 21st CENTURY THEsAURuS 713 (2d ed. 1999).

5. ABA, Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Report
with Recommendationsto the House ofDelegates,Rule 1.8(c) cmt. 8 (2001) [hereinafter

ABA Report], availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rulel 8rem.html (last visited
May 2, 2002).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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disclosure duties of attorneys nominated as fiduciaries, the existence of the
language with regard to seeking appointment is arguably a step backward in this
area of attorney ethics.
This Article proposes the adoption of a "disclosure" model6 with regard to
drafting attorney/fiduciaries to minimize the dual harms of failing to protect
client autonomy and of reputational harm to the legal profession as a whole.
That model would include ethical rules that mandate full disclosure by the
drafting attorney, which theoretically would result in informed consent by the
client to the appointment ofthe lawyer/draftsperson. 7 In conjunction with such
an ethical construct, the model also would include procedural and substantive
rules that provide for increased judicial intervention and scrutiny in such cases.

6. For a comprehensive analysis of the benefits of a disclosure model in another
context, see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: DisclosureLaws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1710-11 (1999) (identifying four
important rationales for disclosure laws, including: (1) the "competition rationale," i.e.,
"disclosure can promote the competitive provision of health insurance and medical
services," ameliorating "longstanding problems of asymmetric information affecting
patients and purchasers . . . and serv[ing] goals of transactional and allocative
efficiency;" (2) the "agency rationale," i.e., "disclosure . . . strengthen[s] agency
relationships and enforce[s] fiduciary obligations," thus "support[ing] efficient decision
making and convey[ing] non-economic values such as respect for persons;" (3) the
"performance rationale," i.e., "disclosure... overcome[s] incomplete information" and,
thus, enhances systernicperformance; and (4) the "democraticrationale," i.e., "disclosure
...increase[s] public awareness" of rights and obligations and "fosters distributive
justice"). Sage has noted that "informed consumerism is incomplete as a normative
model for health care because fiduciary responsibilities... traditionally have been
defined apart from economic considerations or a contractual framework." 1d. at 1711.
Sage's observation is equally applicable to the delivery of legal and fiduciary services.
7. The Author uses the phrase "theoretically" to acknowledge that informed
consent does not necessarily follow from disclosure and that "consent" is not always
what it implies. Acquiescence is not always tantamount to fully informed consent,
especially on the part of those in society most susceptible to subtle societal influence,
including elderly clients, in general, and elderly women, in particular. See, e.g., Robin
West, Liberalismand Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117 (1999). West has stated:
Women consent to events and transactions and arrangements all the
time-day in and day out-that do us considerable harm: from marriages, to
love affairs, to one-night stands, to unequal pay for comparable work, to
sexually harassing work and school environments, to second shifts in the
home, to mommy tracks at work. The harm these consensual relations,
environments, transactions, events, acts and transfers occasion become
increasingly hard to describe, to quantify, to identify, to name, orto recognize
as the language and apparatus of consent-based ethics overtake our moral as
well as legal discursive world.
Id. at 2139.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Drafting attorneys would have the burden of proving disclosure and informed
consent. Failing that, judges would have the discretion to refuse to appoint a
personal representative or to put the representative on a supervised track. If the
drafting attorney is the trust's sole trustee, the court would be required to remove
the attorney if he or she could not rebut the presumption of lack of disclosure.'
In December of 1993, Fordham University School of Law convened an
important conference on the pressing issues involved in representing the elderly
in this country. The conference was the joint effort of a number of
organizations, including: the American Bar Association ("ABA") Commission
on Legal Problems of the Elderly; the ABA Section on Real Property, Probate
and Trust Law; the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC");
and the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys ("NAELA"). The insightful
papers and recommendations that came out of that conference were published
in a special issue of the Fordham Law Review and included the thoughtful
Policy and Ethical
article, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary Roles:
Considerations,by Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello.9 That article
revisited the issue of attorneys acting as fiduciaries, reviewed the previous
literature on the subject, and made a number of important proposals that would

8. The Author will leave for a future article a deeper exploration of the
inadequacies of the disclosure model when it comes to fiduciary relationships. William
Sage summarized them well in the health care context when he noted:
[r]egulating fiduciary obligations through disclosure therefore presents a
logical fallacy. To the extent that the fiduciary obligation between physician
and patient arises from a relationship of dependence, not from an express
contractual agreement, physicians' duty of loyalty arguably should not be
waivable upon disclosure.
Sage, supra note 6, at 1757-64. Similar concerns about lawyer/draftsperson/client
relationships will be briefly considered herein, see infra notes 127-28 and accompanying
text, but a longer analysis of the implications for a disclosure model, and of the
disproportionate power relationship inherent in the lawyer/client relationship will be
addressed in a future article.
9. Edward D. Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other Fiduciary
Roles: Policy and Ethical Considerations, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1357 (1994)
[hereinafter Spurgeon & Ciecarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles]. This Article
owes much to the premises laid out in Professor Spurgeon's and Attorney Ciccarello's
article. It expands on their analysis and delineates additional procedural, statutory, and
structural reforms necessary to deter inappropriate use of attomey/fiduciaries and to
safeguard the client ifdraffing attorneys are allowed to act as executors or trustees. This
Article does not address the issue of attorneys appointed as guardians, a related issue but
one that is so broad as to be outside the scope of this Article. However, Professor
Spurgeon and Attorney Ciccarello recently have written about the specific issue of
attorneys as guardians in a forthcoming article: Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane
Ciccarello, Lawyers Acting as Guardians: Policy and Ethical Considerations,31
STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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enhance the guidance for attorneys acting in those roles. The Report of the
Working Groupon Lawyeras Fiduciaryand the recommendations that came out
of the conference made concrete proposals for reform in this area."0 In
particular, these proposals focused on changes to the ethical principles embodied
in the ABA's Model Rules. However, seven years later, the Ethics 2000
Commission approach to clarification fails to implement these important
proposals fully.
This Article picks up where Spurgeon, Ciccarello, and the Working Group
left off, compares the suggested revisions of the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission
to the Working Group's recommendations, and finds some things to laud but
others to lament. It urges reconsideration by the Ethics 2000 Commission and
further drafting to incorporate all of the safeguards offered by the Fordham
Conference Working Group.
This Article adds several other dimensions to the Fordham Conference's
focus on ethical reform. In addition to endorsing many of the ethical reforms
laid out seven years ago, it delves further into procedural, statutory, and
structural reforms that will reduce the incentives for fiduciary abuse in this area
of the law. The Article offers a cost/benefit analysis of these reforms and
concludes that a multi-faceted approach to reform in this area is appropriate and
justifies the economic and efficiency costs of some of the reforms proposed.
Part II reviews the existing academic literature and theories on the ethical
propriety of drafting attorneys naming themselves as fiduciaries. Part II
proposes changes to the ABA's Model Rules, and Part IV proposes reforms to
the UPC and the new UTC that allow for increased intervention on the part of
the probate court-and, thus, an increased level of protection for vulnerable
elderly clients-in the appointment of drafting attorney/fiduciaries in probate
and trust proceedings. Part V proposes reforms to existing statutory approaches
to fiduciary fee arrangements that would provide disincentives for lawyers to act
as fiduciaries in inappropriate cases. This Article concludes with additional
reforms that will provide more monitoring and compensatory protections for
clients in this area.
This is a critical issue in an era when the American population is aging and
increasingly vulnerable to financial abuse by lawyers acting as fiduciaries. As
trillions of dollars pass from the World War II generation to the Baby Boom
generation, the legal profession must continue its vigilance in analyzing the
underlying ethical, procedural, and structural flaws in the wealth transfer system.
10. Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older
Clients: Recommendations of the Conference, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 997 (1994)
[hereinafter Recommendations of the Conference]; Ned Spurgeon & Mary Jane
Ci.ccarello, Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in Representing Older
Clients: Report of the Working Group on Lawyer as Fiduciary,62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1055 (1994) [hereinafter Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of the Working Group].
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Failure to do so means risking further ethical lapses and consequent damage to
both the public and the profession's overall image.
What follows is a review of many of the monitoring problems inherent in
fiduciary relationships identified by legal scholars, I as well as the ethical issues
of solicitation, conflicts of interest, and overreaching raised by such practice.
This Article then raises the issue whether the legal profession should revise its
ethical rules when it comes to drafting attorneys naming themselves as
fiduciaries. On a more conceptual level, it challenges the prevailing academic
trend in the field of probate law that the preferable model of reallocating
property at death is always a hands-off, minimalist approach to judicial
intervention in the probate process. It argues for a more proactive model of
judicial inquiry in this area.
II. DRAFTING ATTORNEYS AS FIDUCIARIEs:

CURRENT ETHICAL MODELS
The term fiduciary "is derived from the Roman law, and means a person.
•. having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's
benefit in matters connected with such undertaking"' 2 and includes "scrupulous
good faith and candor"'3 among its attributes. Some commentators have
addressed the broader policy question as to whether lawyers have conflicts
created by naming themselves and being appointed as personal representatives
and trustees.
Spurgeon and Ciccarello identified five possible options in terms of
selecting an ethical paradigm for attorney/drafters being named as fiduciaries. 4
From those five options, the Author would distill essentially three different
models that have been offered to deal with this potential conflict of interest: (1)
an "absolute prohibition" model; (2) an "increased judicial inquiry" modelprior
to fiduciary appointment; and (3) an "increased judicial inquiry model with
teeth" that extends scrutiny beyond the initial appointment of a drafting
attorney/fiduciary. This Part briefly reviews those models offered. The
following Part proposes a model that adopts various components of the second
and third approaches, and blends them with disclosure and increased judicial
intervention. This "disclosure" model would place the burden of proving
disclosure and informed consent explicitly on the drafting attorney. It would
provide for judicial discretion as to either removal or continued supervision of

11. See Scott & Scott, supranote 2, at 2418-20.
12. BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Id.
14. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,
at 1382-86.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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the attorney during the probate process, if the attorney failed to meet his or her
burden. This model departs from previous models by bifurcating the analysis
when the fiduciary is a personal representative as opposed to a trustee, and it
offers different tools with which to deal with the failure of meeting the burden.
This differing approach to personal representatives versus trustees isjustified on
the basis of the differing costs to the wealth transfer system. The costs are fewer
when it comes to increasing supervision in the rather short probate process.
They begin to mount in the much longer time frame in which attorneys may act
as trustees.
Because lawyers are steeped in legal rules and hone their analytic abilities
in law school, they appear well-suited to carry out the duties involved in
representing the elderly, the disabled, and the dead."5 A sharp sense of the law
lends itself to fulfilling the duties imposed by statute and case law on executors
and trustees. The ethical training in law school and the regulation of lawyers as
a profession should produce good candidates for fiduciary positions.
What are the general fiduciary duties of a lawyer to her client? In 1953,
Henry S. Drinker quoted then Ethical Canon 11 when he wrote about the lawyer
as fiduciary:
[t]he lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal
benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage ofthe confidence reposed
in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or
other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should
be reported and accounted for promptly."'
Drinker also made the point that the lawyer's fiduciary duty is particularly
strong when the client is borderline competent. "While the lawyer may act for
such a one whom he honestly believes to be competent, he owes him a special
duty not to overreach him." 7 This applies to the lawyer not only as a general
fiduciary but also when the lawyer takes on the specific mantle of "statutory
fiduciary" as executor or guardian.

15. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in OtherFiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,

at 1359. While the Author generally agrees with the proposition that lawyers are "wellsuited" to serve as fiduciaries, they are currently trained to be much more the "zealous
litigator/advocate" who implements the decisions of the client rather than the fiduciary
who often must make independent judgments on behalf of a deceased or incompetent
client. See generally Paula A. Monopoli, TeachingLawyers to Be More than Zealous
Advocates, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 1159.
16. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 11 (1908), cited in HENRY S.
DRnKER, LEGAL ETHics 89 (1953).
17. DRINKER, supra note 16, at 93.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Fiduciary relationships include "trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward,
agent and principal, attorney and client, executor or administrator and legatees
and next of kin of the decedent."' 8 In addition to the general attorney/client
relationship, lawyers who assume the mantle of"statutory fiduciary"--executor,
trustee, or guardian--overlay a more specific dimension onto their general
fiduciary duty. 9 Each of these associations may vary in the depth and nature of
the confidential relationships involved and the fiduciary duties that arise, but
they all are premised on the duty of loyalty that arises when one reposes trust
and confidence in another. As Austin Scott noted in his 1949 article, The
FiduciaryPrinciple:
[t]he greater the independent authority to be exercised by the
fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. Thus, a trustee
is under a stricter duty of loyalty than is an agent upon whom limited
authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only as a
member of the board of directors or a promoter acting for investors in
a new corporation. All of these, however, are fiduciaries and are
subject to the fiduciary principle of loyalty, although not to the same
20
extent.
What are the ethical problems and practical risks associated with attorneys
acting as fiduciaries as opposed to simply attorneys? They may not be obvious
to most clients at first. If a lawyer actually drafts the instrument that names him
or her as personal representative, that act may raise issues later when the lawyer
is paid a fee as personal representative. If the client is weak or frail, there may
be the specter of the lawyer exercising undue influence in pushing the client to
name him or her as fiduciary. If a lawyer represents the client before the client
dies and the lawyer becomes the personal representative post-death, new duties
arise to the client's children, grandchildren, and any other heirs or beneficiaries.
This kind of "multiple representation" often generates serious conflicts of
interest-real or imagined-in the lawyer/fiduciary.
As noted previously, there has been minimal scholarly attention given to this
issue although there have been some discussions among academics and
practitioners over the years. The bulk of the existing literature was brought
together in Professor Spurgeon and Attorney Ciccarello's 1994 article." They
18. Austin Scott, The FiduciaryPrinciple,37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
19. Note that Spurgeon and Ciccarello discuss whether the ethical rules applying
to attorneys extend to attorneys acting as specific fiduciaries. Spurgeon & Ciccarello,
The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9, at 1366-67.

20. Scott, supranote 18, at 541.
21. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supranote
9; see also DRINKER, supranote 16; Luther J. Avery, The Rules ofProfessionalConduct

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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cited the proceedings of an October 1972 conference at which Professor Alan
Polasky hosted a panel of trusts and estates partners from law firms in Michigan,
New York, and Boston.' Polasky characterized the issue of lawyers serving as
executors and trustees as a "subject ofmajor importance, both in terms of service
to clients and in terms of the risk which attorneys may incur." 3 Several authors
have noted the lack of cases in which courts have disciplined attorneys for
naming themselves as fiduciaries in the instruments they draft.' The fact that

for Lawyers Are Confusing, 131 TR.& EST.8 (Apr. 1992); Ronald Chester, The Lawyer
as CharitableFiduciary: Public Trust or Private Gain, 25 PAc. L.J. 1353 (1994);
Bradley R. Cook, NewDevelopmentsAltertheRoleofEstatePlannersinRecommending
Fiduciaries,16 EST. PLAN. 356 (Nov./Dec. 1989); Frank Coolidge, New Avenues for
Lawyers Boasts Old Tradition, 128 TR.& EST. 20 (Dec. 1989); Joseph W. deFuria, Jr.,
A MatterofEthics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsmanas TestamentaryFiduciary,36 U.
KAN. L. REV. 275 (1988); Edgar C. Gentile, I,Lawyers as Executors and Trustees:
Snakes and Ladders, 48 ALA. LAW. 94 (1987); William D. Haught, Attorneys Take
FiduciaryRoles, 127 TR.&EST. 10 (Feb. 1988); GeraldP. Johnston, An EthicalAnalysis
ofCommon EstatePlanningPractices-IsGoodBusinessBadEthics?,45 OHIo ST. L.J.
57 (1984); Louis D. Laurino, The Duties andResponsibilitiesofthe Attorney/Fiduciary,
19 U. MIAMI PHILIP E. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN.

1601.2 (John T. Gaubatz ed.,

1985); Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 745
(1972) (Alan N. Polansky, Moderator, Seminar on The Lawyer's Role and Compensation
in Estates and Trusts); Leonard Levin, LegalRamificationsof UnethicalEstatePractices,

124 TR. & EST. 47 (Oct. 1985); Ronald C. Link, Developments Regarding the
ProfessionalResponsibility of the Estate PlanningLawyer: The Effect of the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 1 (1987); William M.
McGovern, Jr., Undue Influence andProfessionalResponsibility,28 REAL PROP. PROB.

& Ta. J. 643 (1994) (See, in particular, pages 668-73 "Part C. The Drafter as
Fiduciary."); Recommendationsof the Conference,supranote 10; Report ofthe Special
Study Committee on ProfessionalResponsibility, Preparationof Wills and Trusts That
Name Drafting Lawyer as Fiduciary, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 803 (1994)
[hereinafter Report of the SpecialStudy Committee]; Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of
the Working Group, supranote 10; Nancy Stranger Wood, Selection ofFiduciariesand
the Role of the Attorney Draftsperson,Ethical Considerations,AdministrativePowers,
SimultaneousDeath, and TaxApportionment,inHandlingYourFirstBasicWill-1992,
at 207-08 (PLI Tax & Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. D4-5236, 1992);
Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Conduct of Attorney in Capacity of Executor or
AdministratorofDecedent'sEstateas GroundforDisciplinaryAction, 92 A.L.R.3d 655
(1979); Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Attorneys at Law: DisciplinaryProceeding
Based upon Attorney's Naming of Himself or Associate as Executor or Attorney for
Executor in Will Drafted by Him, 57 A.L.R.3d 703 (1974).
22. Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supranote 21.
23. Lawyers Serving as Executors and Trustees, supranote 21, at 745.
24. Wagner, supranote 21, at 705 (Although not disciplining the "two attorneys,

a brother and sister who practiced as partners... court said its opinion was intended to
establish guidelines for future disciplinary proceedings ... the lawyer as scrivener must
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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this is a common-but-ethically-problematic practice has given rise to several
proposed models to constrain attorneys who might engage in it.
A. FirstModel-An "Absolute " ProhibitionModel
The first of these models-an absolute prohibition against lawyers ever
naming themselves as fiduciaries-is laid out clearly in Professor Joseph deFuria
Jr.'s article, A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as
TestamentaryFiduciary.' Professor deFuria noted that:
[o]ne of the more troublesome practices, which has received
surprisingly little attention in the literature, is that of the attorney who
drafts a will that names him as a testamentary fiduciary. It is both
common knowledge and well-documented that lawyers in many
jurisdictions
routinely serve as fiduciaries under wills that they have
26
draVwn

The revenue-generating aspects of such an appointment and the vulnerability of
often elderly clients raise a host of possible ethical pitfalls with the practice.
After reviewing the paucity of ethics committee opinions and court
decisions on the matter, Professor deFuria also criticized the 1983 ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as they apply to this issue. He questioned
whether the profession's tolerance for the practice should be reconsidered and
then proposed a model that he believed "would resolve the ethical problems
implicit in the drafting practice."'27
Professor deFuria noted the ABA Committee on Significant Developments
in Probate and Trust Law Practice's criticism of the Model Rules and their lack
of specificity with regard to "estate practice ethics, and fiduciary designations
in particular."2 In Professor deFuria's view, this lack ofspecificity "underscores
both rules' inadequacy for policing the practice .... In fact, the effect of the

be especially careful that he does not in any way suggest or insinuate that he be
appointed in a fiduciary capacity." (citing State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 733 (Wis.
1972))); see also Landis, supra note 21, at 658-59; Philip White, Jr., Annotation,
Attorneys at Law: DisciplinaryProceedingsfor DraftingInstrument Such as Will or
Trust Under Which Attorney Drafter or Member of Attorney's Family or Law Firm Is

Beneficiary, Grantee,Legatee, or Devisee, 80 A.L.R.5th 597, 609-12 (2000).
25. deFuria, Jr., supra note 21.
26. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 276.
27. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 278.
28. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 298 (citing Link et al., Developments Regarding
the ProfessionalResponsibility of the EstatePlanningLawyer: The Effect of the Model
Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 1, 2 (1987)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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Model Rules is to grant attorneys virtually free license to engage in the practice
of drafting testamentary instruments in which they name themselves
'
fiduciaries."29
Professor deFuria characterized attorneys engaged in such practice as
ignoring "serious problems of conflict of interest, overreaching, undue influence
and solicitation inherent in the drafting practice. The fact that such conduct is
not forbidden under the ethics codes does not make the practice proper, since
even scrupulously ethical behavior will not attenuate the potential for an
appearance of impropriety."3
In response to these observations, Professor deFuria essentially offered an
"absolute prohibition" model. In his view, the rule should be that:
an attorney is absolutely precluded from drafting a testamentary
instrument in which he is named as a fiduciary. Furthermore, any
lawyer who drafts such an instrument would not be permitted to serve
in afiduciary capacity thereunder. Finally, if a client insists that his
regular attorney serve in a fiduciary capacity under his will, the
document would have to be drafted by a truly independent attorney.3'
Professor deFuria observed that "[d]espite the potential for abuse, lawyers
continue to act as fiduciaries under wills that they have drafted, perhaps because
relatively few courts, ethics committees, or commentators have seriously
questioned such behavior."32
B. Second Model-IncreasedJudicialScrutiny Priorto Appointment
The second model-increased judicial scrutiny prior to initial
appointment-was delineated by Professor Gerald Johnston. In his article, An
EthicalAnalysisof Common EstatePlanningPractices-IsGoodBusinessBad
Ethics?,3 3 Professor Johnston noted that:
the practice exists among attorneys in certain areas of the country to
name themselves as executors in wills that they draft... an attorney
qua executor can, in a particular estate, "earn" a fee that is well
beyond what that same attorney might receive for the performance of

29. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 298-99.
30. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 300.
31. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 309.
32. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 277.
33. Johnston, supranote 21.
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comparable
legal services involving the same expenditure of time and
4
3

effort.

Professor Johnston reviewed the ethical problems raised by this practice,
including conflicts of interest and improper solicitation. He noted that the risks
of overreaching vis ivis an existing client may be even greater than with a new
client, given the relationship of trust and confidence between the old client and
the attorney. Like Professor deFuria, Professor Johnston highlighted the
retrenchment in the ABA's Model Rules, which dropped the prior (and more
specific) Ethical Consideration 5-6 ("EC 5-6") of the ABA's prior Model Code
ofProfessional Responsibility ("Model Code"), which prohibited a lawyer from
"consciously influencing" a client to name him as fiduciary or lawyer in the
3
instrument. In his article, Professor Johnston analyzed a number of ethics opinions in
the area, including one from the New York Committee on Professional Ethics
that interpreted the phrase "'consciously influence"' to mean "substantially less
psychological pressure than 'undue influence."' 36 The Committee did find some
circumstances in which it might be ethical for a lawyer to suggest himself or
herself. For example, these might include situations where the parties "had a
long term relationship." 37 Estate of Weinstock 8 was an example of a court's

finding that lawyer/executors were guilty of "impropriety and overreaching"
when the two attorneys (father and son) had just met the testator who "had not
independently and freely designated the attorneys to be his executors."39' The
court based its decision on the old Model Code's EC 5-6, adopted by New York
in its own state ethics code.40
Professor Johnston concluded that, "all things considered, much canbe said
from an ethical standpoint for an absolute prohibition of the designation of an
attorney-draftsman as executor or trustee."14 ' However, he offered an alternative
solution. Rather than an absolute ban on lawyer/scriveners acting as fiduciaries,
Professor Johnston suggested that:

34. Johnston, supra note 21, at 86-87.
35. Johnston, supra note 21, at 91.

36. Johnston, supra note 21, at 92 (citing N.Y. Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 481
(1978)).
37. Johnston, supra note 21, at 92.
38. 351 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 1976).
39. Johnston, supra note 21, at 93.
40. Johnston, supra note 21, at 93.
41. Johnston, supra note 21, at 97.
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a lawyer who has been designated as executor or testamentary trustee
in a will that he or she has drawn could be required, after [the] death
of the testator, to prove that the decedent did in fact request that the
attorney-draftsman act in a fiduciary capacity, and that the scrivener
did not improperly influence the testator in this regard.4'
This would, at a minimum, prevent such an attorney from being appointed in
cases where he or she did not know the testator before drafting the will.
Specifically, Professor Johnston would offer beneficiaries the opportunity
for input at the initial stages of the probate court proceedings. Even if the
beneficiaries did not bring a complaint, the court could take aproactive approach
in reviewing the attorney's conduct, as beneficiaries often are not familiar with
the process or the issues. As Professor Johnston noted, "an attorney's conduct
maybe subject to question from an ethical standpoint even though private parties
decide not to challenge the appointment."43
Professor Johnston observed that such additional inquiry and procedures
on the part of the probate court "may seem inconsistent with the spirit of the
Uniform Probate Code with its emphasis on limited judicial involvement and
informal probate administration." He argued correctly, however, that it only
would apply to draftsmen who name themselves as fiduciaries and, thus, only
would affect a small number of wills offered for probate. In conjunction with
are-enactment ofthe old Model Code's EC 5-6, Professor Johnston saw his twopronged model as a way to deter attorneys from naming themselves in
inappropriate cases."
C. Third Model-IncreasedJudicialScrutiny Priorto
andAfter Appointment
As if to buttress Professor Johnston's point from a "real world" perspective,
Judge Louis Laurino, a Surrogate (Probate Judge) of Queens County, New York,
delivered a scathing indictment of lawyers who act as fiduciaries at a major
estate planning institute.45 In his remarks, Judge Laurino noted the 1975 ABA
Statement of Principles regarding probate practice. In particular, he recited

42. Johnston, supra note 21, at 99.
43. Johnston, supra note 21, at 99-100.
44. Johnston, supra note 21, at 100.
45. Laurino, supra note 21, 1600. The readers should note that some might
observe that Judge Laurino is an interested party in the probate process and that probate
judges might be expected to prefer more oversight rather than less given their role.
While this may be true, it does not mean that such changes may not also be necessary
from an objective perspective.
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Principle #4, which "sets forth... that an attorney may serve both as a personal
representative of a decedent's estate as well as counsel to the personal
representative and may receive reasonable compensation for his aggregate
services and responsibilities."' Judge Laurino sharply criticized this rule and
stated that it was his opinion that Principle #4 perpetuated the practice of dual
roles "for the sake of profit rather than remedy one of the primary causes for
justifiable public criticism of the legal profession in the settlement of decedent's
estates."'47 He took particular aim at "the attorney who has himself named
executor in a will he drafts and thereafter acts as a fiduciary."' 48
Judge Laurino echoed the alarm at the then newly-revised ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which eliminated EC 5-6. Judge Laurino made
it clear that he vehemently disagreed with the ABA Committee that drafted the
new Model Rules, when it included a comment that:
the provisions of EC 5-6 regarding the appointment of
attorney/fiduciary/draftsman are adequately covered by the general
conflict of interest provision of Model Rule 1.7 and the specific
provisions of Rule 1.7(a) which provides that a lawyer should not
enter into a business transaction with his client unless the transaction
is fair and equitable to the client.49
Judge Laurino made the point in his speech that he believed that this
retrenchment in the Model Rules was a serious mistake.
Judge Laurino, like many other commentators, was struck by the lack of
decisional authority on the issue. He said that he had "found little information
in the way of hard data concerning the extent to which lawyers serve as
executors or administrators" but found the little information available "very
enlightening.""0 The 1975 American Bar Foundation study on the issue found
that:
an attorney served as personal representative or as co-fiduciary in 11
percent of Florida estates, 10 percent of Maryland estates and 10
percent of Massachusetts estates. By contrast, an attorney served as
personal representative in only 2 percent of the Texas estates and less
than 1 percent of California estates. This stark contrast was attributed

46. Laurino, supra note 21,

1600 (citing 1975 ABA Statement of Principles,

Reports of ABA, 1201-1207, 1205 (1975)).
47. Laurino, supra note 21, 1600.
48. Laurino, supra note 21, 1600.
49. Laurino, supra note 21, T 1601.1.
50. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.2.
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to the fact that the case law of both California and Texas follow the
majority common law rule that in the absence of [a] statute which
provides otherwise, an executor or administrator is not generally
entitled to extra compensation for legal services rendered by him in
connection with the estate. Needless to say, nether Texas nor
California have legislation permitting double compensation whereas
the laws of Florida, Maryland and Massachusetts do permit it."
In his remarks to the institute audience, Judge Laurino made the connection
between the double-dipping allowed in some states and the willingness of
lawyers to serve as fiduciaries. He rejected the argument that lawyers act as
fiduciaries for motives other than money.
Judge Laurino described how he had begun to keep statistics in his own
New York courtroom as to how many attorneys were acting as fiduciaries.52 His
own results comported with those of the American Bar Foundation study. "Ten
percent of the probate filings in [his] court involved an
attomey/fiduciary/draftsman." Like Professor Johnston, Judge Laurino rejected
an absolute prohibition model as the solution to the problem of self-interested
attorneys acting out of profit rather than fiduciary concern for their clients. 4
Judge Laurino embraced a model of "increased judicial scrutiny" at the time of
appointment but modified that model by adding a limited amount of continuing
judicial scrutiny in terms of such attorneys having to file additional accounts-an
"increased judicial scrutiny with teeth" model.
Judge Laurino made the case that, in some instances, the client's long-time
attorney is the best guardian of the client's interests and is the right choice as
fiduciary. However, his experience as a probate court judge had shown him that
"the true abuses of professional standards [arise from] the appointment of [an]
attorney/draftsman who is otherwise a stranger to the testator, not the friend,
relative or long time advisor."'55 Judge Laurino noted that in the first forty
probates he kept track of in 1984, twenty-four had simple estates with family
members who were capable of taking on the role of executor. 6 Judge Laurino
expressed frustration with the fact that he, as a judicial officer, was not able to
give the beneficiaries of such estates a good answer to the question of why "the
decedent chose to appoint the attorney/draftsman as executor and in seven
instances the attorney's partner as an alternate or co-executor [when there were

51. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.2.
52. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.2.
53. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.2.
54. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
55. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
56. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
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family members who were capable of performing the duties] and thus add
57
commissions to the administration.
Because most estates in his court were settled by means of a "Receipt and
Release'; (as are probably the majority of estates in the nation's probate courts),
statutory requirements that the court review and set the attorney's fee were of
little practical value in safeguarding against overreaching. 8 Judge Laurino
suggested first and foremost that courts begin to keep statewide records of all
appointments of attorneys as executor/administrators. Such record keeping is
useful to identify repeat offenders and provide a "chilling effect to future
wrongdoers." 9
Judge Laurino also required in his court "that the decree appointing the
attorney/fiduciary provide that he or she must account within one year after the
date of the decree if the size of the taxable estate is below the federal taxable
limit and within two years if it is above the federal taxable limit."60 Judge
Laurino created this rule on his own. But, in his opinion, "an attorney because
of his professional responsibility is under higher duty of care and his
performance is subject to closer scrutiny by the court than the ordinary
layman."'" Therefore, Judge Laurino felt that the compulsory accounting he
required was "well within the discretionary power of the court to regulate the
performance of its officers, the attorney/fiduciary." He viewed it as his "way
of insuring that those attorneys who insist on acting as fiduciary will do so
properly and expeditiously."'63
Judge Laurino concluded his remarks by offering a model that presumes
that:
absent a family relationship, every attorney/fiduciary who is also the
draftsman of the will should be under a duty to explain his nomination
in a plenary hearing. His refusal or his failure to satisfactorily explain
the circumstances and show that the nomination was freely and
willingly made, should give rise to a presumption, or at very least, an
inference that his nomination was the product of undue influence.'

57. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.3.
58. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
59. Laurino, supranote 21, $ 1601.3.
60. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
61. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.3.
62. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.3.
63. Laurino, supranote 21, 1601.3.
64. Laurino, supra note 21, 1601.3.
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Judge Laurino acknowledged, however, that the current ethical and
doctrinal approach across the country is that "the mere fact that an attorney is
designated executor by a will he drafted does not in and of itself give rise to a
presumption of undue influence."65 Judge Laurino concluded that:
an attorney draftsman should only serve as fiduciary at the unsolicited
suggestion ofhis client and if he agrees to serve, he should realize that
there are grave legal, ethical and practical problems that he may have
to overcome in order to perform his duties as a fiduciary and as an
attorney.
Some of Judge Laurino's concerns were addressed in Section 2307-a of the
Surrogate's Court Procedure Act, signed into law on August 2, 1995, by New
York Governor George Pataki. That recent statute provides that:
when an attorney prepares a will to be proved in the courts ofthis state
and such attorney or a then affiliated attorney is therein an executordesignee, the testator shall be informed prior to the execution of the
will that:
(a) subject to limited statutory exceptions, any person, including an
attorney, is eligible to serve as an executor;
(b) absent an agreement to the contrary, any person, including an
attorney, who serves as an executor is entitled to receive an executor's
statutory commissions; and
(c) if such attorney or an affiliated attorney renders legal services in
connection with the executor's official duties, such attorney or a then
affiliated attorney is entitled to receive just and reasonable
compensation for such legal services, in addition to the executor's
statutory commissions.67
The statute also requires that the testator acknowledge receiving this
disclosure as to dual compensation in writing.6" In connection with state69 and
local ° court rules, this statute goes a long way toward full implementation of a

65. Laurino, supranote 21,

1601.3.

66. Laurino, supra note 21, 1603.
67. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACTLAW § 2307-a(l)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1997).
68. N.Y. SuRR. CT. PROC. AcT LAW § 2307-a (McKinney 1997).
69. N.Y. UNIFORM RULES FOR SURR. Cr. § 207.52 (McKinney 2002). In addition,

Section 207.52 of the New York Uniform Rules for Surrogate's Court provides that
attorneys who are sole executors and who are also acting as counsel for the estate must
file an affidavit that reveals their fees and the commissions paid to them or their firms.
70. N.Y. QUEENS COUNTY SURR. CT. RULES § 1858.1 (McKinney 2002); N.Y.
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model that discourages dual roles in inappropriate cases while increasing
scrutiny of drafting attorneys who nanie themselves as executors.
Spurgeon and Ciccarello noted that some lawyers have little concern about
attorneys acting as fiduciaries, emphasizing that, in an era of tough competition,
the number of those Americans needing fiduciaries is increasing and taking on
the role of fiduciary is a way to expand one's practice.7 There are, however,
many in the legal profession and in academia who realize that, while the
profession should encourage the use of well-trained lawyer/fiduciaries given the
increasing demographic and structural needs (due in part to the loss of traditional
bank trust services) there must be increased protection for those vulnerable
clients who rely on their trustworthiness in doing so. The scent of undue
influence hangs heavy over drafting attorneys, in particular, who name
themselves in their clients' wills or trusts as the fiduciary. Professor Jeffrey
Pennell, of the Emory University Law School, cited an attorney that he greatly
admires, Floyd McGown, for the rule of thumb that a smart lawyer should not
"accept service as a fiduciary in a trust or will created by a client.""2 While there
may well be appropriate cases, "the practical reality is that being named as a
fiduciary or as an attorney for a fiduciary [in the will itself] raises eyebrows; the
presumption ois that [an] impropriety resulted in the designation unless the
attorney can establish otherwise."73
New York Attorney Joshua Rubenstein echoed this sentiment:
[a]ttorneys who have represented individuals and families over a
period of many years are frequently uniquely qualified to serve as
executors for such individuals. Indeed, it is the norm rather than the
exception in England and in certain parts of the United States, in
particular the Boston area, for attorneys to serve as executors. In New
York, however, the phrase "attorney/executor" or "attorney/fiduciary"
might be uttered in the same breath as "carpetbagger" with the result

SUFFOLKCOUNTY SURR. CT.RULES §§ 1850.6(b), 1850.10 (McKinney 2002). In Suffolk
County and Queens County, the local rules go even further, providing that where the will
nominated an attorney as a fiduciary, the attorney must file an affidavit with the probate
petition setting forth the testator's reasons for nominating the attorney to serve as
fiduciary.
71. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,
at 1368 n.47 (citing several articles in which "[s]ome commentators have also pointed
out that forbusiness reasons, lawyers should accept opportunities to be a fiduciary, as the
changing nature of estate planning law is curtailing the amount of legal work needed in
the field").
72. Jeffrey N. Pennell, Ethics, Professionalism,andMalpracticeIssues in Estate
Planningand Administration, SC 75 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 67, 168 (June 14, 1998).
73. Id. at 166.
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that the nomination of an attorney as an executor is regarded by many
as presumptively bad. The fact of the matter is that in no other area of
the law is the abuse, and the potential for abuse, so great as in the area
of attorney/executors, who have temporary legal title to assets that
belong beneficially to someone else.74
The profession could allay the public distrust of lawyer/fiduciaries if it
embraced either the first model-an "absolute prohibition" on
attorney/draftspersons-or a "disclosure" model, which combines the increased
judicial scrutiny of the second and third models with the placement ofthe burden
on the drafing attorney to prove disclosure and informed consent. This model
would give courts the discretion to order continuing supervision of
lawyer/fiduciaries in appropriate cases. However, it would treat drafting
attorneys who name themselves as personal representatives differently from
those naming themselves as trustees. To achieve the greatest impact in reducing
drafing lawyer/fiduciary malfeasance, this embrace of a revised ethical rule in
the area should be done in conjunction with amendments to the procedural rules
governing the appointment and removal of fiduciaries under the UPC and the
UTC. In addition, pursuing legislative change regarding attorney fees in such
cases, as well as implementing random audits, improving the safety net for the
victims of such attorneys when damage results, and better educating clients, is
imperative.
IH. REFORMING TBE ABA MODEL RULES
Presumably, ethical codes are meant to enforce professional norms and
avoid harm to clients or patients. The specific harms to be concerned with in the
lawyer/draftsperson/fiduciary context include impinging on client autonomy (and
balancing that risk with the preservation of clients' freedom to contract with a
fiduciary of their choice). The harms also include the reputational cost to the
legal profession as a whole imposed by systemic failures to protect individual
client autonomy. In addition, the monitoring problems with lawyer/fiduciaries
are increased when neither family members nor the probate court is given a
significant oversight role in the process. The risk of breach of the fundamental
fiduciary duty of loyalty and perhaps outright theft are all increased in a system
allowing untrammeled freedom to name one's own fiduciary but lacking
disclosure and informed consent as elements of that model.
The ethical rules that govern lawyers frown upon the act of asking one's
client to name one as executor. Historically, the profession's position was that,

74. Joshua S. Rubenstein, Compensation of Attorney/Executors: Practitioners
Often CaughtBetween Scylla and Charybdis,N.Y. L.J., Apr. 29, 1996, at 9.
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"so long as the client originally had the idea for the attorney to serve as
fiduciary, then there were no ethical violations. ' 75 The advent of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility-a set of ethical aspirations and
prohibitions-in 1969 set the stage for a more precise explication of the
profession's concern about solicitation in this realm. EC 5-6 provided that: "a
lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as executor, trustee
or lawyer in such instrument. In those cases where a client wishes to name his
lawyer as such, care should be taken by the lawyer to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety. '76 But ethical considerations were not prohibitions-they were
merely goals to which lawyers were to aspire."
The more recent ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct stripped that
provision out of the new ethical paradigm. The ABA subsumed the issue under
the more general conflict of interest rules in Rules 1.7 and 1.8. An original draft
contained a note in the Commentary that a lawyer should not seek to have
himself named in an instrument as executor, but the note was dropped from the
final rules.78 The profession's ethical rules seem to have retrenched in protecting
elderly and otherwise susceptible clients from those few unscrupulous lawyers
who might prey upon them by insinuating themselves into their last wills and
testaments.
The December 1993 Fordham University School of Law conference was
a significant event in terms of the working group reports and the scholarship that
came out of the meeting.79 Edward D. Spurgeon and Mary Jane Ciccarello's
conference article essentially embraced the third model with improved disclosure

75. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,
at 1376. As Spurgeon and Ciccarello have noted, the 1908 Canons of Professional
Responsibility, the precursorto the Model Code, werenot seen as prohibiting thepractice
of lawyers acting as executors. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in OtherFiduciary
Roles, supranote 9, at 1376. Spurgeon and Ciccarello cite words by Henry S. Drinker
and Joseph A. deFuria, both of whom note the lack of concern about lawyers serving as
fiduciaries. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra
note 9, at 1375 n.73, 1376 n.74.
76. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-6 (1969), reprintedin JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 429
(West Group ed., 1998-99) (1959). Note that this Article focuses on the role of ABA
Model Rules, but there are other sources of law that inform the ethical rules in this area,
including The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers. For a list of all these sources, see Report ofthe SpecialStudy Committee, supra
note 21, at 806-07.
77. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,
at 1376.
78. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supranote 9,
at 1377 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (Proposed Final Draft 1981)).
79. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, Report of the Working Group, supra note 10.
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and monitoring safeguards in place. 0 They endorsed the idea of revising the
Model Rules to be more well-defined in this area and to offer more guidance to
lawyer/fiduciaries. However, in the midst of a comprehensive review of the oftcriticized Model Rules in this area seven years later, it appears that the Ethics
2000 proposals will not only fail to revive the more specific guidance lost when
EC 5-6 was written out in 1983 but may take the Model Rules from an arguably
neutral position on the issue to one that expressly allows lawyers to "seek" such
appointments.
As the Model Rules no longer specifically address lawyers being named as
and acting in the role of fiduciary, the result has been that lawyers now have less
explicit guidance about assuming the role of executor or trustee than they did
under the Model Code prior to 1983. The major five-year review of the Model
Rules by the Ethics 2000 Commission entertained a wide variety of changes to
the Model Rules. The Commission issued its four-hundred-page final report on
November 27, 2000."1 While the report suggested hundreds of changes to the
Model Rules, none of these changes would replace the language of EC 5-6,
deleted from the 1983 Model Rules. In fact, these proposed revisions would
raise the serious questions of whether the profession now explicitly permits
solicitation of clients by lawyers seeking to be fiduciaries.
In May of2001, the Authorposed a question to members of the Ethics 2000
Commission as to whether any group had proposed reviving the Model Code's
EC 5-6 that "a lawyer should not consciously influence a client to name him as
executor, trustee or lawyer in an instrument." The Reporter for the Commission
responded that:
[t]he Commission is recommending that the text of Rule 1.8(c) be
amended to prohibit lawyers from soliciting "any substantial gift from
a client including a testamentary gift." A new Comment [8] will
provide as follows: "This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from
seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer
named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially
lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be
subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when
there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the
appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent
professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of
an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed

80. Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,

at 1357.
81. James Podgers, NewABA ModelRules MayBe Under Constructionin the Next
Few Months, 87 ABA J. 58 (May 2001).
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consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning
the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the
appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for
2
the position.1
Rather than reinstating the explicit prohibition against consciously
influencing a client to name one as a fiduciary, the new commentary actually
states that "this Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer
or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or
to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position."83 This is rather remarkable
language, as it does not prohibit lawyers from seeking to have their clients name
them as a fiduciary." "Seeking" is synonymous with "soliciting,"85 so the
provision may fairly be read to mean that it will be acceptable for a lawyer to
suggest that a client name him or her as a fiduciary in the will that the lawyer is
drafting. That is contrary to the prior understanding that, while a drafting
attorney may serve as a fiduciary, it is not ethical for the lawyer to solicit -read
seek-such appointment. (It is in direct contradiction to EC 5-6 as described in
a Reporter's Note dropped from the final commentary to Model Rule 1.8 that
"EC 5-6 of the Code states that a lawyer should not seek to have himself or a
86
partner or associate named in an instrument as executor of the client's estate.")
While this change in language simply may reflect what many lawyers are
actually doing, in practice, such a sea change in the ethical tradition that frowns
upon such solicitation only should have been made with a full and open

82. Posting of Professor Nancy J. Moore, nmoore@bu.edu, Boston University
School of Law, Chief Reporter, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission (May 18, 2001) during
ABA Teleconference on the Ethics 2000 proposed revisions (copy on file with Author)
(citing proposed revision to ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, available at
www.abanet.org). In the Reporter's Explanation of Changes, the drafters state:
This new Comment clarifies a present ambiguity by addressing the question
of whether appointment of the lawyer or the lawyer's firm as executor
constitutes a "substantial gift" within the meaning of this Rule. The
commission believes that such appointments are not "gifts" but that they may
create a conflict of interest between the client and the lawyer that would be
governed by Rule 1.7.
ABA Report, supra note 5.
83. ABA Report, supra note 5.
84. ABA Report, supranote 5. Note that the Comment does not specifically apply
to drafting attorneys. It seems to allow all lawyers to seek to have themselves named as
executor or any other lucrative fiduciary position.
85. ROGET'S 21st CENTURY THESAURUS 713 (2d ed. 1999).
86. See Report ofthe Special Study Committee, supra note 21, at 803 n.14; supra
note 76.
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identification and discussion of this issue as an important change-standing
separately and apart from the issue of gifts to lawyers.87
Ethics 2000 did better when it came to the second part of the Comment.
The Commission did include a provision that such lawyer/fiduciary
appointments are subject to conflict of interest rules under the Model Rules when
there is a "significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment
will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising
the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary."88 The
sentence is then linked to the next one, which only requires full disclosure when
there is a conflict. However, such appointments are, in essence, always aperse
conflict of interest when the attorney seeking appointment is also the drafting
attorney. The situation is replete with "serious problems of conflict of interest,
overreaching, undue influence, and solicitation."89
The Author suggests that: (1) the rule should stand on its own (and not be
simply an adjunct to a rule on gifts to lawyers, which is a related but
conceptually separate matter); (2) it essentially should specify either in a Rule
itself or in a Comment that a drafting attorney seeking such an appointment
constitutes aperse conflict in this context-in other words, any time a lawyer
is drafting the instrument that names him or her as a fiduciary, it is not up to the
attorney to decide that there is a conflict, but rather, such a conflict exists in this
situation, and there must be mandatory disclosure; and (3) that the phrase
"executor" should be changed to "personal representative" in keeping with the
modem trend under the UPC.9"
ACTEC is an organization of lawyers expert in wills, trusts, and estate
planning. Over the years, ACTEC has attempted to bridge the gap between the

87. The Author has suggested to the Ethics 2000 Commission that the Comment
could be changed to read: "This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from accepting an
appointment as executor or other potentially lucrative fiduciary position." This would
still effectuate the Commission's desire to clarify that such appointments do not
constitute "gifts" but still preserve the ethical tradition ofnot allowing lawyers to "seek"
such appointments.
88. ABA Report, supranote 5.
89. deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 299. For an extensive analysis of why a drafting
attorneynaminghimselforherselfas fidupiaryin the instrumentraises all ofthese issues,
see deFuria, Jr., supra note 21, at 300-06.
90. As noted above, the Author discussed with the Reporter for the Ethics 2000

Commission, by e-mail, her concerns with the phrase "seek" and offered suggestions for
alternative language. However, by the time the Author raised the concern in the Fall of
2001, the proposed Rule 1.8 and Comment (c) already had been approved at the August
2001 ABA Annual Meeting. The Ethics 2000 Reporter was thus understandably
reluctant to revisit the issue at the February 2002 mid-year meeting of the ABA House
of Delegates when the remainder of the Ethics 2000 proposals were to be debated.
Perhaps this issue could be considered during a future review ofthe ABA Model Rules.
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Model Rules-written with the zealous litigator in mind rather than lawyers
acting in other roles-and the world of trusts and estates lawyers. ACTEC's
comment on Model Rule 1.7, written in 1985, prior to the Ethics 2000 revisions,
and its effect on the issue of soliciting appointment as executor is as follows:
An individual is generally free to select and appoint whomever he or
she wishes to a fiduciary office (e.g., trustee, executor, attorney-infact). None of the provisions of the MRPC deals explicitly with the
propriety of a lawyer preparing for a client a will or document that
appoints the lawyer to a fiduciary office. As a general proposition
lawyers should be permitted to assist adequately informed clients who
wish to appoint their lawyers as fiduciaries. Accordingly, a lawyer
should be free to prepare a document that appoints the lawyer to a
fiduciary office so long as the client is properly informed, the
appointment does not violate the conflict of interest rules ofthe MRPC
1.7 ...and the appointment is not the product of undue influence or

improper solicitation by the lawyer.9'
ACTEC goes on to define an informed client as one who is "provided with
information regarding the role and duties of the fiduciary, the ability of the lay
person to serve as fiduciary with legal and other professional assistance, and the
comparative cost of appointing the lawyer or other person or institution as
fiduciary."" The Ethics 2000 Commission shouldbe commended for including
language in the new Comment to Rule 1.8(c) that appears to adopt a disclosure
requirement similar to that posited by ACTEC as necessary to a "properly
informed" client. The language states that:

91. THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST & ESTATE COUNSEL, ACTEC
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 156 (3d ed.
available at
1999)[hereinafter ACTEC COMMENTARIES],
http://www.actecfoundation.org/pdfdocs/commental.PDF.

92. Id. at 155-56. The ACTEC Commentary to Rule 1.7 also notes in the
paragraph entitled Selection of Fiduciariesthat:
The lawyer advising a client regarding the selection and appointment of a

fiduciary should make full disclosure to the client of any benefits that the
lawyer may receive as a result of the appointment. In particular, the lawyer

should inform the client of any policies or practices known to the lawyer that
the fiduciaries under consideration may follow with respect to the
employment of the scrivener of an estate planning document as counsel for
the fiduciary. The lawyer may also point out that a fiduciary has the right to

choose any counsel it wishes.
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[n]evertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general
conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant
risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will
materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in
advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other
fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict
the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent
of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the
availability of alternative candidates for the position.93
Ethics 2000, in essence, has adopted the caveat, laid out by ACTEC in its
Commentaries to the Model Rules, that, when discussing the appointment of a
personal representative or trustee, the lawyer should properly inform the client
of the issues involved.94 The ABA's Section on Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law's Principlesfor Attorneys Acting in Other FiduciaryRoles95 are
similarly aimed at ensuring that attorneys chosen as fiduciaries protect their
clients' interests by disclosure. For example, Principle 9, titled Role of the
Attorney in Advising the Client, emphasized that, "[r]egardless of whether the
attorney is named as a fiduciary, it is the responsibility of the attorney to advise
the client as to the considerations affecting the choice of an appropriate
fiduciary." '96
While endorsing Ethics 2000's embrace of the duty to disclose, the Author
would change the Committee's disclosure provision to mandate that a "lawyer
must advise the client," rather than "should" do so if the lawyer is also the
draftsperson. The Comment also should be made into a free-standing rule and
should not be subsumed as a mere Comment to Rule 1.8(c). Finally, it should
include a proviso that an attorney who drafts an instrument that names him or her
as a fiduciary constitutes aper se conflict and that such attorney does not have

93. ABA Report, supranote 5.
94. ACTEC COMMENTARIES, supranote 91, at 155-56.
95. Principlesfor Attorneys Acting in Other FiduciaryRoles, 1992 A.B.A. SEC.
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.L., cited in Bradley R. Cook, Principlesfor Attorneys Acting
in OtherFiduciaryRoles, 6 PROB. & PROP., MariApr. 1992, at 6. In an article seeking
comments on the proposed Principles by Bradley R. Cook in the "For Your Information"
section of Probate & Property, Cook stated that, while the Section Council of the
American Bar Association Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section believes that
it is appropriate for a drafting attorney to act as an executor or trustee, "performing in
such roles carries additional responsibilities and certain risks for the attorney, and no
attorney should undertake to serve as an executor, trustee or other fiduciary without being
properly trained and equipped to perform all of the associated tasks in a competent and
efficient manner." Id.
96. Id.
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the discretion to decide if there is such a conflict sufficient to trigger the
mandatory disclosure requirement." Providing a clear ethical rule that is aimed
directly at drafting lawyer/fiduciaries is consistent with a profession that cares
about the inherent ethical problems replete in such appointments--solicitation,
conflicts of interest, overreaching, and undue influence-all of which are
implicated by the financial benefit to the fiduciary in the first place.98
Lawyers are often the best choice as personal representative or trustee.
Elderly clients often have a long relationship with and great confidence in their
lawyer. Given the mobility of families in twenty-first century America, those
clients may have tenuous connections at best to their children or siblings in other
parts of the country. Certainly lawyers who are well versed in fiduciary
responsibilities and who are constrained by ethical rules and malpractice
concerns are prime candidates for the job of fiduciary.
The problem is that lawyers work for money-making it hard to separate
money as motivation for taking on the mantle of fiduciary from the genuine
concern that family or friends might have in taking on the same role. As long

97. The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the
ABA Committee that issues opinions on ethical issues) is in the process of drafting such
an opinion on the topic of "The Lawyer Acting as Fiduciary for the Trust or Estate."
Hopefully, this opinion will make it clear that naming oneself as a fiduciary is aperse
conflict that requires disclosure and waiver of the conflict by informed consent of the
client.
98. Historically, fiduciaries were not entitled compensation for their services. As
a comparative law matter, in England, the common law concept of a fiduciary as a person
in whom a testator could "impose a purely conscientious obligation, a precatory, moral
duty, to confer a benefit upon a third party" still exists. See de Furia, Jr., supra note 21,
at 305. Professor deFuria stated:
Under normal circumstances, a testamentary fiduciary [in England] is not
entitled to remuneration for his services . . ., and this rule extends to
"solicitors acting as estate fiduciaries, who are only entitled to out-of-pocket
expenses .... The reason for the rule is to prevent the inherent conflict of
interest and self-dealing that inevitably results whenever a fiduciary profits
from his trust.... Because of this, the English cases reason that a fiduciary
may not be compensated for his time and trouble. However, if the testator
specifically directs in his will that the fiduciary is to receive compensation,
payment will be permitted.... Since it would be improper for an attorney to
suggest that his client include a fee payment clause in the will, and since it
takes an affirmative act on the part of the client to authorize a fiduciary's fee,
the English rule would appear to reduce somewhat the potential for

impropriety whenever an attorney drafts a will that names himself as a
testamentary fiduciary.
de Furia, Jr., supra note 21, at 305 n.159; see also In re Duke of Norfolk Settlement

Trust Perth (Earl) v. Fitzalan-Howard, 3 W.L.R. 455 (Eng. C.A. 1981).
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as the client understands this, there should be no problem. But, with elderly and
infirm clients, there is always an issue of understanding and volitional action.
Clients also should be aware that, in addition to a personal representative,
their estate will require an attorney. Counsel for the estate, in fact, requires
special legal expertise. When a lawyer is named as the personal representative,
he or she is faced with the odd prospect of hiring a lawyer for the estate, and
herein lies one of the ethical pitfalls. Can a lawyer/personal representative
really make a detached judgment about who is the best lawyer for the job? Is
the lawyer really going to hire someone else, or is the lawyer simply going to
hire himself or herself to do the second job as counsel for the estate?
Clients should be made aware of this duality of roles and the inherent
potential conflicts. They are often under the misimpression that the executor has
to perform the legal tasks necessary to probate the estate or manage the trust and
do not realize that a sophisticated layperson can hire a lawyer to perform these
tasks. However, there is no bright line between an informed client who initiates
a discussion about his lawyer becoming his fiduciary and an uninformed client
whose lawyer solicits the job. Probing into the murky, gray waters of the
decision-making process post-facto is difficult atbest. Thus, in conjunction with
the overarching ethical model proposed above, this Article submits that
concomitant procedural reforms must occur that address the issues of whether
disclosure has been properly made and whether the client is actually informed.
Given the increasing graying ofthe American population, its mobility, and
a trend toward bank trust services being consolidated or eliminated altogether,
there is a legitimate need for some clients to choose their lawyer as their
fiduciary. Thus, the Author would not embrace the absolute prohibition model,
which would prevent such cases of conflict of interest but which would be
overbroad in terms of preventing appropriate appointments of drafting lawyer/
fiduciaries. From a cost/benefit perspective, the benefits of the absolute
prohibition model are outweighed by the costs to the public of not having
enough well-trained fiduciaries to assist them." However, the Author
acknowledges that the drafting attorney conflict is pervasive and the risk of
breach of the duty of loyalty and impaired judgment as to economic benefit to
the attorney so likely that those scholars who would embrace such a model are
not clearly wrong. It is a close call, and there are strong arguments in favor of
adopting that model as the default rule.
Given the "consensus" nature of the Ethics 2000 Commission's activity and
the practical obstacles to having states change their procedural rules in the

99. See Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supranote
9, at 1383 (citing Levin, supra note 21, at 50, for the proposition that an absolute
prohibition would also cause "serious disruption to the legitimate expectations of the
client").
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probate and trust areas-especially states with large cities where lawyers
routinely act as trustees for long-standing clients'°°--the Author believes that a
"disclosure" model, rather than an absolute prohibition, is the more politicallysaleable model and will meet with more success in implementation-thus
engendering more likely reform. The next Part of this Article sketches the
parameters of procedural reforms, in the context of the UPC and the UTC, that
would provide a mechanism to actually implement and to enforce the ethical
reforms discussed in the prior Part.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURAL MODEL FOR
DRAFTING ATTORNEY/FIDUCIARIES:

THE UPC AND UTC 1°'
When the American public thinks of probate, it assumes a system that
involves the courts and a personal representative of some sort-a personal
representative or administrator. This is the only model that most Americans
have ever known. The English system of court-supervised administration of
estates, inherited by American law, was designed to protect creditors and

100. For example, cities like Boston and Philadelphia, where the "practice of
lawyers serving as trustees ... iscommon... several law firms have sizeable in-house

trust departments and individual lawyers have served families as trustees for
generations." Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in OtherFiduciaryRoles, supranote
9, at 1373 ('One estimate is that Boston law firms, in the aggregate, have assets under
fiduciary management in the range of $3 to $4 billion." (citing Haught, supranote 21,
at 10)). Spurgeon and Ciccarello note that "virtually the same ethical considerations
apply either when a lawyer who has drafted a will is designated as the will's executor or
when a lawyer who prepares an inter vivos or testamentary trust is named to serve as
trustee." Spurgeon & Ciccarello, The Lawyer in Other FiduciaryRoles, supra note 9,
at 1373 n.64 (citing Johnston, supra note 21, at 88). The Author also should note that
the risk of loss to clients of these larger firms arising from their drafting the instruments
in which they are named as fiduciaries is practically less because larger firms tend to
have malpractice and/or fiduciary insurance in place and assets that a beneficiary can
reach if a victim of malfeasance.
101. Some of the participants in the UTC Symposium would embrace the ethical
reforms noted above. They are reluctant to add concomitant procedural changes to the
UPC and UTC, seeing these as contrary to the non-interventionist philosophy underlying
both Codes. While the Author believes such procedural changes are necessary to give
teeth to the ethical rules, and can be done at marginal cost to the overall noninterventionist model, she would suggest that the proposed changes to the statutory
section also could be implemented in the Comments. That may allay the concern of
some Joint Editorial Board members about putting these procedural changes into the
statutes, while still providing a framework for states to adopt in enforcing disclosure
requirements.
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beneficiaries from untrustworthy executors or heirs. But other models of
reallocating wealth at death exist, including the universal succession model
extant in the civil law countries of Europe.'" Under this system, the heirs or
beneficiaries take title to the decedent's property automatically, and there is no
personal representative to act as an intermediary.
In the 1960s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws launched a project to create a streamlined, uniform set ofprobate statutes
that states could adopt to modernize and improve their probate procedures. In
1969, this effort resulted in the UPC."' That set of laws has been adopted in
whole by more than fifteen states, and parts of the UPC have been incorporated
by virtually every other state.tos The promulgation of the 1969 UPC signaled the
willingness of some segment of the profession to push for improved procedures
in probate and to help the public get through this important process with less
pain and expense.
Somewhere between supervised probate administration and universal
succession lies unsupervised probate-the modem trend embraced by many
American legal scholars and adopted by the drafters of the UPC as its preferred
mode of probate administration." 6 The theory underlying unsupervised probate
is that, "unless there is a compelling reason, once an executor or trustee is
appointed, the court should step back and let the fiduciary administer the estate

102. For a succinct description of the system of universal succession "on the
continent ofEurope, in Louisiana and in Quebec," see JESSE DUKEMINIER& STANLEYM.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 50 (5th ed. 1995).
103. SeeUNF.PROBATECODE §§ 3-312 to 3-322,8 U.LA. pt. II, at 66-75 (1998).
But, note that "[n]o state has yet adopted these provisions of the [Uniform Probate
Code]." DUKEM iNER & JOHANSON, supra note 102, at 51 (citing Eugene F. Scoles,
Succession Without Administration: PastandFuture,48 Mo. L. REV. 371 (1983)).
104. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History andAnalysis of the 1990
Uniform ProbateCode, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 896 (1992).
105. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE tbl. ofjurisdictions, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 1 (1998 &
Supp.2001).
106. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28
(1998). This general comment states that:
Overall, the system accepts the premise that the Court's role in regard to
probate and administration, and its relationship to personal representatives
who derive their power from public appointment, is whollypassive until some
interested person invokes its power to secure resolution ofamatter. The state,
through the Court, should provide remedies which are suitable and efficient
to protect any and all rights regarding succession, but should refrain from
intruding into family affairs unless relief is requested, and limit its relief to
that sought.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. H, at 26, 28 (1998).
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and close it without court intervention." 7 Academics, some judges, and many
members of the profession have moved toward this position in large part as a
response to the public's feeling that probate equals delay and, thus, cost.'0 8 The
movement also reflects the growing importance ofnonprobate assets in the lives
of many Americans, and it attempts to pull the probate process into closer
conformity with the transfer of nonprobate assets like joint property, living
trusts, and life insurance.
This academic and legislative response to the real and perceived problems
in American probate is laudable as it actually attempts to bring real-world
solutions to real people. The problem is that-as always-there is more than
one public interest at stake in the probate process. While a minimalist approach
to judicial intervention in the probate process is responsive to the broad public
concern about court intervention causing expense and delay, there is a competing
concern illustrated by the discussion above when a drafting attorney names
himself or herself as the fiduciary. For those clients, there well may be a need
for more intervention rather than less.
How can the two policy concerns be reconciled? The answer may lie in an
alternative model of probate for some cases that involve drafting
attorney/fiduciaries-carving out a dual track that allows the court to require
continuing supervision when such a drafting lawyer is acting as a personal
representative and cannot meet the burden of proving disclosure and informed
consent. This heightened level of intervention and scrutiny is not completely
without support in the literature. Louis Laurino has written a powerful brief for
justifying a higher level of scrutiny for lawyers when they petition for probate
and appointment. Judge Laurino was a Surrogate ofQueens County, New York,
for a number of years when he wrote:
In my opinion an attorney because of his professional responsibility is
under a higher duty of care and his performance is subject to closer
scrutiny by the court than the ordinary layman. Therefore, the
compulsory accounting which I insist on is well within the
discretionary power of the court to regulate the performance of its
officers, the attorney/fiduciary. It is my way of insuring that those
attorneys who insist on acting as fiduciary will do so properly and
expeditiously."°

107. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 (1998).
108. Richard V. Wellman, GeorgiaLawyers Revise Their ProbateCode, 13 GA.
ST. U. L. Rnv. 783, 783-84 (1997).
109. Laurino, supra note 21, $ 1601.2.
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Judge Laurino also required that the decree appointing such an
attorney/fiduciary include a requirement that the attorney account to the court
within one year if the estate is below the federal exemption equivalent and
within two if it is above. He acknowledged that he made no similar requirement
ofnon-lawyer fiduciaries but makes the "officer of the court" argument in favor
of this treatment, which might be perceived as "discriminatory."
The UPC's overall ethos is that the state only should act in probate matters
when called upon by the interested parties."' It does provide for a supervised
administration option when a single proceeding, with official court adjudication
of all important administrative decisions, is the desired forum." Nevertheless,
the thrust of probate reform under the Code is that most estates will not require
this supervised process. Nonetheless, there is an argument that more
intervention-not less-is the better approach in the case of drafting
lawyer/fiduciaries. The UPC should take a page from existing New York rules
in this area and build in a judicial inquiry at the time of appointment if the
petitioner for appointment as personal representative is the drafting attorney.
The drafters should place the burden ofproving disclosure and informed consent
on the drafting attorney when petitioning for appointment as personal
representative. Ifthe drafting attorney fails to meet this burden, the judge would
have the discretion either to refuse appointment or to invoke supervised
administration. The number of such cases is small and the period of probate
fairly short; thus, the increased systemic economic and efficiency costs of
supervised administration are worth the benefits to the beneficiaries of such
added supervision.
The Uniform Surrogate's Rules in New York and the local rules in Suffolk
and Queens Counties provide a model for the UPC in this regard."' The
Uniform Surrogate's Rules in New York "[r]equires [the] filing of a statement
at the time of probate disclosing whether ... [the] named fiduciary is an
attorney, whether [the] attorney will be estate counsel, and whether [the]
attorney was the [drafter]."'"3 The Rules also address the concern about fees that
such an appointment raises, mandating that sole lawyer/fiduciaries who are also
counsel to the estate file an affidavit regarding their fees and commissions within
twelve months of their appointment." 4
In Suffolk County, New York, there is a local rule, which provides that:

110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. In general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 26, 28 (1998).
111. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998).
112. Wood, supra note 21, at 206-07.
113. Wood, supranote 21, at 206 (citing N.Y. UNIFoRM RULES FOR SURR. CT. §
207.19(g) (McKinney 2002)).
114. Wood, supra note 21, at 206 (citing N.Y. UNIFoRM RULES FOR SURR. CT. §
207.19(g) (McKinney 2002)).
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in all probate proceedings where the purported will and/or codicil of
the deceased nominates an attorney as a fiduciary or co-fiduciary,
there shall be annexed to the probate petition an affidavit of the
testator setting forth the following:
1. That the testator was advised that the nominated attorney
may be entitled to a legal fee, as well as to the fiduciary
commissions authorized by statute;
2. Where the attorney is nominated to serve as a co-fiduciary,
that the testator was apprised of the fact that multiple
commissions may be due and payable out of the funds of the
estate; and
3. The testator's reason for nominating the attorney to serve as
fiduciary.
Failure to submit an affidavit of this nature may warrant the
scheduling of a hearing in order to determine whether the appointment
of the attorney as fiduciary was procured by the exercise of fraud
and/or undue influence upon the decedent." 5
Queens County is similar and requires an account from a lawyer/fiduciary
within twelve months of appointment (or twenty-four months if a federal estate
tax return is required) regardless of whether there is another lawyer serving as
counsel to the estate. Unlike most cases where beneficiaries are allowed to
waive the account if they are comfortable, when the lawyer is also the fiduciary,
no waiver is allowed. The Queens County Court is even more specific than the
Suffolk County Court in its rule about affidavits, requiring the affidavit to
contain:
[(1)] the length and nature of the attorney's association with [the]
testator prior to [the date of the] will[; (2) the] reasons the decedent
gave for selecting the attorney as fiduciary[; (3)] conversations
between the testator and the attorney-draft[er] re[garding] fees and
commissions[; (4)] whether [the] attorney-fiduciary orh[er] firm [will]
also [serve as the] estate attorney, and if not, why not... [; and (5) the]
attorney must attach h[er] drafting notes, including next-of-kin data." 6
These New York probate rules provide a useful prototype for developing
a model that builds in a more proactive judicial inquiry at the time of

115. Wood, supranote 21, at 207-08 (citing N.Y. SUFFOLK COUNTY SURR. CT.

RULES §§ 1850.6(b), 1850.10 (McKinney 2002)).
116. Wood, supranote 21, at 207 (citing N.Y. QUEENS COUNTY SURR. CT. RuLEs
§ 1858.1 (McKinney 2002)).
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appointment and the possibility ofsupervised administration when attorneys fail
to meet that burden." 7 The UPC is the effective vehicle for implementing such
a model and the one best positioned to have a national impact.
8
A. DraftingAttorneys as PersonalRepresentatives"'

Sections 3-3011" and 3-402"2' of the UPC provide for the contents of the
application for informal and formal probate, as well as the request for
appointment ofthe personal representative.' These Sections essentially require
certain statements be contained in the petition. The drafters of the Code might
consider inserting an additional requirement that the petitioner must disclose in
the application if he or she was also the attorney who drafted the will.
The inclusion of this information would trigger an inquiry by the court at
the hearing provided for in Section 34031' as to whether the drafting attorney
in fact made full disclosure to the client and whether the client gave informed

117. The Author thinks it is important to give judges the discretion to trigger
supervised administration because, for many years after such reforms would be
implemented, there wouldbe cases ofdrafting attorney/fiduciaries who wouldnotbe able
to meet the burden simply because the will was drafted prior to disclosure becoming
mandatory. In such cases, the judge could review the affidavit and decide for herself
whether there was the "scent" of undue influence or overreaching. If not, giving the
judge the discretion to order supervised probate would not defeat the intent ofthe testator
but, rather, would serve to solve some of the monitoring problems inherent in such
appointments. It also raises the cost of naming the lawyer as fiduciary and might act as
a disincentive for such appointments in the future in inappropriate cases-cases that lack
adequate disclosure and informed consent-as information trickles down to attorneys and
testators.
118. When a court appoints a lawyer as a personal representative in an intestacy
situation, there is a strong argument that supervised administration should be mandatory.
This is particularly true in a case where the court appoints an administrator for an
intestate decedent's estate because there are no close relatives and the only takers are
more distant kin out of state. The lawyer in the case has had no dealings with the
decedent, and the decedent has shown no preference for the lawyer. However, the
Author leaves this issue for another article. Note, however, that there is deep concern
among some in the legal community about how such appointments are made. See
SpecialCommittee on FiduciaryAppointmentsCreated,43 N.Y. STATEBARNEWS, Jan.Feb. 2002, at 1. "In early 2000, the chief judge [of New York State] appointed both a
commission and a special inspector general to examine the system of fiduciary
appointments, which critics call rife with cronyism." Id.
119. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-301, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 55-56 (1998).
120. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-402, 8 U.L.A. pt. HI,at 79 (1998).
121. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-301, 3-402, 8 U.L.A. pt. HI,at 55-56,79 (1998).
122. UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 3-403, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 80-81 (1998).
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consent to the nomination of the drafting attorney as the personal representative.
The standard for full disclosure and informed consent could be the ACTEC
standard articulated in its Commentaries or that contained in the new Comment
8 of the Ethics 2000 revisions to Model Rule 1.8. The proof might include a
form of written disclosure similar to that provided by the Georgia Supreme Court
in their Formal Advisory Opinion No. 91-Ri, which states: "
A testator's or settlor's freedom to select an executor or trustee is
an important freedom, and it should not be restricted absent strong
justification. For a variety of reasons, the attorney may be the most
appropriate choice of fiduciary for the client. The risk that some
lawyers may take advantage of a lawyer-client relationship to benefit
themselves in a manner not in the client's best interest should not
outweigh that freedom.
The risk ofself-dealing instead creates the need for restrictions that
offer assurance that the naming of the lawyer as executor or trustee is
the informed decision of the testator or settlor. An attorney's full
disclosure is essential to the client's informed decision and consent.
Disclosure requires notification of the attorney's potential interest in
the arrangement; i.e., the ability to collect an executor's or trustee's
fee and possibly attorneys fees. Unlike a real estate transaction where
an attorney has a personal interest in the property, being named as
executor or trustee does not give the attorney any personal interest in
the estate or trust assets other than the fee charged. Waiver of State
law fiduciary requirements in the document is permissible as long as
waiver is ordinary and customary in similar documents for similar
clients that do not name the attorney as fiduciary.
In the light of the above, full disclosure in this context should
include an explanation of the following:
1. All potential choices of executor or trustee, their relative
abilities, competence, safety and integrity, and their fee structure;
2. The nature of the representation and service that will result if
the client wishes to name the attorney as executor or trustee (i.e.,
what the exact role of the lawyer as fiduciary will be, what the
lawyer's fee structure will be as a lawyer/fiduciary, etc.);
3. The potential for the attorney executor or trustee hiring him or
herself or his or her firm to represent the estate or trust, and the fee
arrangement anticipated; and

123. Supreme Court of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. 91-1 (1991) (on file with the

Missouri Law Review). The Author would like to thank Professor Anne Emmanuel for
bringing the Georgia Advisory Opinion to her attention.
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4. An explanation of the potential advantages to the client of
seeking independent legal advice.
These disclosures may be made orally or in writing, but the client's
consent or the attorney's notice to the client should be in writing.
The client's consent could be obtained by having the client sign a
consent form that outlines the information described above."
That form and notification and consent letter covers the issues of other
candidates for the position and double-compensation as well as a statement of
the client that the choice is voluntary, that the conflicts were disclosed, and that
the opportunity for independent legal advice was provided. The drafters should
make clear that the burden is on the attorney to prove disclosure and informed
consent.
At the hearing, the court would have to decide whether the attorney met the
burden, in which case the appointment could proceed without further court
intervention. If the attorney failed to meet the burden, the court could choose to
refuse appointment or order supervised administration under Section 3-501. The
rationale for giving the court discretion at this juncture is to confer on the court
some deference in deciding whether this particular case involves undue influence
or overreaching (in which case a refusal to appoint would be appropriate), or
whether the attorney knew the client for a long time, there is little risk of undue
influence, and the attorney simply drafted the will prior to mandatory disclosure
rules being enacted or was sloppy in documenting the decision-making process.
Obviously, as the years proceed after enactment of the disclosure model, judges

124. The Form of Consent Offered in the Georgia Advisory Opinion reads:
,have voluntarilynamed as executor
I,
(Client)
_
(Attorney)_
and trustee in my will and trust,
who prepared the instrument in his/her capacity as my attorney. MrJMs.
did not promote himselfherselfor
.(Attorney)
consciously influence me in the decision to name him/her as executor and
trustee. In addition, Mr.IMs.

(Attorney)

has

disclosed the potential conflicts which he/she thinks might arise as a result of
his/her serving as both executor and trustee and as attorney for the estate and
trust. An explanation of the different roles as fiduciary and attorney, an
explanation of the risks and disadvantages of this dual representation, an

explanation of the manner in which his/her compensation will be determined,
and an opportunity to seek independent legal advice were provided to me
prior to my signing this consent.
Date

(Signature)
Supreme Court of Georgia, Formal Advisory Op. 91-1 (1991) (on file with the Missouri
Law Review).
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should be more and more reluctant to forgive a lack of documented disclosure
and informed consent.
Section 3-501 of the Code and the Sections that follow allow the court to
impose supervised administration on a particular estate. Section 3-501 defines
supervised administration as:
a single in rem proceeding to secure complete administration and
settlement of a decedent's estate under the continuing authority of the
Court which extends until entry of an order approving distribution of
the estate and discharging the personal representative or other order
terminating the proceeding."Z
Section 3-502 allows the court to approve a petition for supervised
administration if: (1) the will directs it, unless circumstances have changed and
it is no longer necessary; (2) the will directs unsupervised administration but the
court feels that there is a real need to protect the beneficiaries; or (3) the will is
silent and "the Court finds that supervised administration is necessary under the
circumstances.' 26
Shifting some drafting attorney cases to the supervised track is appropriate
in that most lawyer/fiduciaries take on the mantle of fiduciary as a business
matter. They also may be doing it to accommodate the client or the court. This,
however, does not diminish the fact that they are essentially professional
fiduciaries. While supervised administration may cost the decedent's estate
more, perhaps this added cost is a small price to pay to prevent abuse of the
fiduciary role. The profession may have to choose between being more
interventionist and minimizing cases of lawyer/fiduciary ethical and financial
abuse, and being more laissez-faire but living with the costs of more of these
cases. The inherent risks of breach of traditional trust and agency rules in terms
of the duty of loyalty and conflicts of interest are so great as to warrant the
economic and efficiency costs in terms of a few estates being put on a supervised
track. Such a rule indeed would shift those additional costs to clients who might
well have a firm desire for their lawyer to act as fiduciary. But this particular
allocation of costs seems appropriate in light of the increased protection for all
vulnerable clients that such a model would yield. Adopting this model would go
a long way toward assuring the public that the profession is actively
discouraging attorneys from taking advantage of their elderly clients.
Supervised administration under Section 3-502 does not bring with it a
requirement that the personal representative check in with the court prior to
every action. To accomplish this, the personal representative's letters of

125. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998).
126. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 105 (1998).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6

36

Monopoli: Monopoli: Fiduciary Duty:

2002]

FIDUCIARYDUTY

appointment mustbe marked or"endorsed" to indicate to thirdparties, like banks
or brokerage houses, that he or she needs permission from the court to take
action, like buying or selling securities."' The drafters of the UPC should
consider amending Section 3-504 to require such restrictions on the power of a
drafting lawyer who has not met the burden of disclosure and informed consent
but who has been allowed to proceed under supervised administration. This
would help prevent the misuse of liquid assets in bank accounts or brokerage
accounts by drafting lawyer/fiduciaries that often occurs in cases of
lawyer/fiduciary abuse. Other restrictions may be appropriate, as well.
In addition to the revisions outlined above, the drafters might well consider
making the drafting attorney's posting bond and filing accounts mandatory acts
not subject to waiver by the testator or the beneficiaries. Section 3-603 provides
that the court may require bond unless the will waives the requirement." Such
a waiver should be disallowed in the case of drafting attorneys. This would add
a layer of protection for the beneficiaries. Informed consent or not, the practice
is so replete with conflicts and lack of oversight that bond should be made
mandatory in such cases.
Waiver ofaccounts by naive beneficiaries is another problem in many cases
of lawyer/fiduciary abuse. In Section 3-1001, the drafters could add a proviso
that a drafting attorney closing an estate must file an accounting, thus preventing
waiver of such by consent of the beneficiaries."z While making accountings
mandatory deprives the beneficiaries of the choice to make the administration
less costly, that restriction must be weighed against the benefit of preventing
future cases of drafting attorney abuse.
The costs to the overall probate system of such revisions to the Code are
minimal. They will not affect estates that do not have drafting lawyers
petitioning to be personal representatives-which are the vast majority.
Admittedly, these changes will impose a marginally greater cost on that small
percentage of cases that involve drafting lawyer/fiduciaries, but those costs will
be well worth the benefits of increased court oversight of lawyers who have
enormous power over the assets of decedents. This proposal thus minimizes the
costs to the overall system as much as possible by targeting a narrow group of
cases that the legal profession can regulate and has an interest in overseeingprobate matters in which lawyers are accepting appointments as fiduciaries in
their professional capacities. The bench and the bar have a significant selfinterest in making sure that such fiduciaries act in the most ethical manner
possible.

127. UNiF. PROBATE CODE § 3-504, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 108 (1998).
128. UNtF. PROBATE CODE § 3-603, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 115 (1998).
129. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-1001, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 288 (1998).
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B. DraftingAttorneys as Trustees13 °
Part IV, A, above, endorsed a model for the appointment of draffing
attorneys as personal representatives that would give the court the authority
either to refuse to appoint the petitioner or to put him or her on a supervised
track. As personal representatives serve for a relatively short period and their
duties are fairly discrete, this seems an appropriate response to the ethical
problems of drafting attorney/fiduciaries in the probate context. When it comes
to trusts, however, the duties of trustee generally last much longer. Supervised
administration seems too burdensome to impose on the system in13this context
because the supervision would have to go on for a very long time. 1

130. Article VII of the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC") attempts to harmonize the
treatment of such trusts within the system of wealth transfer and to streamline the
procedures for administering them and providing a forum for disputes. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE art. VII general cmt., 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 483 (1998). The Uniform Trust
Code ("UTC") essentially replaces Article VII. For a discussion of the UTC's
provisions, see David M. English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your Future?, 14
PROB. & PROP. 25 (Jan.Feb. 2000).
131. Note that the Section of the UTC that governs judicial proceedings makes
clear the preference for a minimalist approach to judicial intervention or continuing
supervision of trusts. See UNiF. TRUST CODE § 201 (2000) [hereinafter UTC], which
provides as follows:
(a) The court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent its
jurisdiction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law. (b) A
trust is not subject to continuing judicial supervision unless ordered by the
court. (c) A judicial proceeding involving a trust may relate to any matter
involving the trust's administration, including a request for instructions and
an action to declare rights.
The Comment to Section 201 provides:
While the Uniform Trust Code encourages the resolution of disputes without
resort to the courts by providing such options as the nonjudicial settlement
authorized by [§] 111, the court is always available to the extent its
jurisdiction is invoked by interested persons. The jurisdiction of the court
with respect to trust matters is inherent and historical and also includes the
ability to act on its own initiative, to appoint a special master to investigate
the facts of a case, and to provide a trustee with instructions even in the
absence of an actual dispute. Contrary to the trust statutes in some States, the
Uniform Trust Code does not create a system of routine or mandatory court
supervision. While subsection (b) authorizes a court to direct that a particular
trust be subject to continuing court supervision, the court's intervention will
normally be confined to the particular matter brought before it.
UTC § 201 cmt.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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In Section 201 of the UTC, 13 2 the court is given the unilateral authority to
intervene when itsjurisdiction is invoked by persons interested inthe trust under
Section 201 or as provided by law. The Author proposes making a drafting
attorney who is a sole trustee ofa trust grounds for removal under Section 706.33

132. UTC § 201.
133. Note the fairly recent California statute that allows the court to scrutinize
drafting attorney/sole trustee cases and give its approval-at least providing for those
cases where the lawyer may be the only appropriate trustee-but discouraging the
practice. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15642 (West 2000) (providing for the removal by the
court of a sole trustee who also drafted the instrument unless the court finds no undue
influence). This Section reads:
(a) A trustee may be removed in accordance with the trust instrument, by the
court on its own motion, or on petition of a settlor, cotrustee, or beneficiary
under Section 17200.
(b) The grounds for removal of a trustee by the court include the following:
(6) Where the sole trustee is a person described in subdivision (a) of
Section 21350, whether or not the person is the transferee of a donative
transfer by the transferor, unless, based upon any evidence of the intent
of the settlor and all other facts and circumstances, which shall be made
known to the court, the court finds that it is consistent with the settlor's
intent that the trustee continue to serve andthat this intent was not the
product offraud, menace, duress, or undue influence. Any waiverby the
settlor ofthisprovisionis againstpublicpolicyandshallbe void. This
paragraph shall not apply to instruments that became irrevocable on or
before January 1, 1994. This paragraph shall not apply if any of the
following conditions are met:
(A) The settlor is related by blood or marriage to, or is a
cohabitant with, any one or more of the trustees, the person who
drafted or transcribed the instrument, orthe person who caused the
instrument to be transcribed.
(B) The instrument is reviewed by an independent attorney who
(1) counsels the settlor about the nature of his or her intended
trustee designation and (2) signs and delivers to the settlor and the
designated trustee a certificate in substantially the following form:
CERTIFICATE OF INDEPENDENT REVIEW
, have reviewed
(attorney's name)
and have counseled my client,
(name of instrument)
,fully and privately on the nature and
(name of client)
legal effect of the designation as trustee of
(name of trustee)
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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The court should be required to make the same sort of inquiry as to whether an

contained in such instrument. I am so disassociated from the interest of the
person named as trustee as to be in a position to advise my client impartially
and confidentially as to the consequences of the designation. On the basis of
this counsel, I conclude that the designation of a person who would otherwise
be subject to removal underparagraph (6) ofsubdivision (b) ofSection 15642
of the Probate Code is clearly the settlor's intent and such intent is not the
product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.
(Date)
(Name of attorney)
This independent review and certification may occur eitherbefore or after the
instrument has been executed, and if it occurs after the date of execution, the
named trustee shall not be subject to removal under this paragraph. Any
attorney whose written engagement signed by the client is expressly limited
to the preparation of a certificate under this subdivision, including the prior
counseling, shall not be considered to otherwise represent the client.
(C) After full disclosure of the relationships of the persons
involved, the instrument is approved pursuant to an order under
Article 10 (commencing with Section 2580) of Chapter 6 of Part
4 of Division 4.
(7) For other good cause.
(c) If, pursuant to paragraph (6) of subdivision (b), the court finds that the
designation of the trustee was not consistent with the intent of the settlor or
was the product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence, the person
being removed as trustee shall bear all costp of the proceeding, including
reasonable attorney's fees.
(d) If the court finds that the petition for removal of the trustee was filed in
bad faith and that removal would be contrary to the settlor's intent, the court
may order that the person or persons seeking the removal of the trustee bear
all or any part of the costs ofthe proceeding, including reasonable attorney's
fees.
(e) If it appears to the court that trust property or the interests of a beneficiary
may suffer loss or injury pending a decision on a petition for removal of a
trustee and any appellate review, the court may, on its own motion or on
petition of a cotrustee or beneficiary, compel the trustee whose removal is
sought to surrender trust property to a cotrustee or to a receiver or temporary
trustee. The court may also suspend the powers of the trustee to the extent the
court deems necessary.
(f) For purposes of this section, the term "related by blood or marriage" shall
include persons within the seventh degree.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15642 (West 2000); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21351 (a), 21355
(West 2000) (providing that a gift to a drafting attorney is invalid ifthe drafting attorney
is not a relative of or cohabitant with the testator, or if another independent attorney has
not executed a certificate of independent review or a court does not determine there was
no undue influence).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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attorney who is the sole trustee of the trust drafted the instrument in question.
If he or she did, the court would have the power to inquire as to whether there
was appropriate disclosure and informed consent. If the drafting attorney/trustee
meets his or her burden of proving such disclosure and informed consent, the
attorney would continue on as trustee. If the attorney fails to meet that burden,
however, the court would have to remove the attorney from his or her role, thus
making such lack of disclosure a grounds for removal under Section 706. The
court would not have the discretion, in this case, to supervise the administration
of the trust as such supervision might go on for a long time, thus shifting the
balance in terms of the cost/benefit to the overall wealth transfer system. A new
trustee would have to be found-admittedly thwarting the intent ofsome settlors
but, on balance, ensuring the integrity of the overall systems of trust
administration and attorney ethics. One might argue that a lack of disclosure and
informed consent in this context essentially renders the settlor's intent to choose
that particular trustee defective. It was not an intent formed with the full
information and, thus, given American courts' historical focus on the settlor's
intent in trust law, should be viewed as a failure to form proper intent. This may
be a removal rationale that is conceptually consistent with the jurisprudential
tradition in the trust law area.
Even if the drafting attorney meets his or her burden ofproving disclosure
and informed consent, the drafters might consider building in an added layer of
beneficiary protection by making the obligation to post bond under Section 702
mandatory and the duty to inform and report under Section 813 mandatory."M
This would protect unknowing settlors and beneficiaries from waiving important
protections."'
All of the changes proposed are based on the premise that it is the unusual
case where a testator or settlor would use a lawyer as the fiduciary. Thus, the
increased costs of judicial intervention and mandatory bond and accountings
affect only a small number ofcases in which there is a significant underlying risk
of unethical behavior.'36 The specific changes are certainly open to debate
among those in the profession, but there is no doubt that a failure to shine a

134. Note that the drafters of the UTC stated that the provisions in Article 8 are
default rules, most ofwhich may be superseded by the trustee-except the duty to notify
beneficiaries and to respond to their requests in certain circumstances. See UTC §
105(8)-(9). To add teeth to the mandatory bond requirements, the drafters might consider
making this provision a "non-default rule" in Section 105(b) not subject to waiver in the
trust when the drafting attorney is the sole trustee.
135. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16062(e) (West 2000) (stating "any limitation or
waiver in a trust instrument ofthe obligation to account is against public policy and shall
be void as to any sole trustee who is a disqualified person as defined in Section
21350.5").
136. For a similar argument, see deFuria, Jr., supranote 21, at 275.
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brighter light on drafting attorney/fiduciary cases will result in additional
headlines about "bad" lawyers who have abused their clients' trust. That cost to
the profession and the victims of these lawyers is incalculable.
V. ADDITIONAL STRUCTURAL REFORMS

There are additional mechanisms that would minimize the risk of
inappropriate use of drafting attorney/fiduciaries. In states that allow "doubledipping," i.e., payment to a lawyer for his or her work as executor plus payment
for his or her work as lawyer for the estate, lawyers act as executors in about ten
percent of the cases probated.'37 In states that frown on such "double-dipping,"
only one percent or two percent of the estates have attorney/executors.I3 Given
these statistics, it is pretty clear that money is a primary motivation for taking on
the duties and liabilities posed by acting as the fiduciary rather than just as the
fiduciary's lawyer.
This monetary incentive and the close relationship between elderly client
and savvy lawyer is ripe for potential abuse. Removing the incentive to do both
jobs should reduce the temptation to solicit the nomination as executor, and the
statistics indicate that it does. The profession has taken some steps to remove the
financial incentive for attorneys to act as fiduciaries as well as taking on the role
of attorney for the estate or trust. In some states, attorneys have been allowed
to "double dip"-or to be paid for their work in both capacities. The more recent
trend has been away from "double dipping," in large part as a response to the
public's perception that it again takes advantage of the client for the lawyer's
benefit. Two of the largest and most legally influential states have been the
battlegrounds where this issue has been fought out during the past decade.
California and New York have hosted legislative battles over the issue of
"double dipping" with very different results.
California is a "statutory fee schedule" state in which both the executor and
the basic attorney's fee are not based on the actual amount of work done for the
estate. Rather, they are a percentage of the probate estate itself, and the same
percentage is given to both the executor and the attorney. New York is a
"statutory fee schedule" state with regard to executor's fees, and lawyers may
also collect fees for their legal services in addition to their executor's fees, when
acting in both capacities. 39

137.

Laurino, supra note 21,

1601.2 (describing a 1975 American Bar

Foundation comparative study of estate administration in the United States).
138. Laurino, supra note 21,
1601.2 (describing a 1975 American Bar
Foundation comparative study of estate administration in the United States).
139. CAL. PROB. CODE § 10800 (West 2000); N.Y. SuRR. CT. PRoc. ACT LAW §

2307 (McKinney 1997). A majority of states allow double-dipping according to Laurino,
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The legislative push to address executor compensation in California was a
direct result of the fallout from the Gunderson case in Orange County." Prior
to the changes in the California law, case law alone indicated that an attorney
who acted as both an attorney and an executor should not be allowed to take the
full amount of both fees.' However, in the wake of Gunderson (in addition to
several other important legislative changes), the California Assembly responded
to the public outcry by codifying the prohibition on "double dipping,"creating
a clear statutory bar against the practice.'42
While the California Assembly grappled with the issue, a New York
Advisory Panel chaired by two judges proposed legislation to address the
problem. During the debate on the proposed bill dealing with "double-dipping"
in New York, lawyers and bar associations fell on both sides of the issue. One
of the chairs of the Advisory Committee on the proposed legislation said that
concern about lawyer/executors appeared to be "very widespread,"' 43 particularly
in New York City where as many as twenty-five percent ofestates had executors
who also served as the attorney for the estate.'" The Advisory Committee
proposed a bill that it said would "'reduce the potential for abuse' and
'overreaching by lawyers'." 4 ' The Advisory Committee bill would have cut the
executor commission in halfunless an attorney disclosed the dual compensation
and obtained a written waiver from the client. Facing vigorous opposition, the
sponsors of the package dropped this piece in July 1993.'"
While the New York State Bar's Trusts and Estates Law Section endorsed
the bill, the powerful Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the
New York County Lawyer's Association spoke adamantly against the limit on
executors' commissions. Their position was that lawyers should be entitled to

supranote 21, .1600.
140. For a description of the high-profile Gunderson case, see Davan Maharaj,
Leisure World Lawyer Heir to Clients' Millions; Estates: James D. Gunderson, Who

PreparedWills for Thousands ofRetirees, Vigorously Denies Wrongdoing, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1992, at Al. See also Estate of Merrill A. Miller v. James D. Gunderson, No.
A-166214 (Orange County Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1998) (No. G016789 consolidated with
No. G017879) (on file with Author).
141. Similarly, case law discouraged gifts to drafting attorneys prior to the
California Assembly's enactment of a specific probate code section on the matter. See
Magee v. State Bar of Cal., 374 P.2d 807, 810-13 (Cal. 1962).
142. CAL. PROB. CODE § 10804 (West 2000).
143. Gary Spencer, Opinion Divided on Changes to Surrogate'sAct, N.Y. L.J.,
May 26, 1993, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Gary Spencer, CountyLayersSuggestMeasureonExecutorFees,N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 6, 1993, at 1.
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full executors' commissions and should be given "reasonable compensation" for
attorney services based on the work done. 47 Jerome Solomon, on behalf of the
New York County Lawyers, took the position that the bill was "'an unwarranted
attack upon the integrity of the bar as a whole"' and that "'[t]here [was] no
empirical evidence of widespread abuses and, to the extent that there are abuses,
there are adequate policing measures in place.""" Even before the bill was
passed, a practice had developed among New York's surrogate judges to reduce
the legal fees of attorney/executors to half the amount of the executor's
commission.

149

After two years of debate, a much-watered-down version that "inverts the
presumption '"' in the Committee's bill was passed. It provided that a full
commission would be paid unless the disclosure requirement was violated
"rather than limiting payment to half the statutory rate unless the client consents
to more." '' The Advisory Committee, while defeated in its efforts for stricter
legislation, announced the final bill would increase disclosure and enhance client
understanding of the dual compensation issue-one of the Advisory
Committee's main concerns. 52
The EPTL Advisory Committee drafted its reduced commission
proposal in 1993, responding in part to public complaints about the
growing cost of administering estates and the duplication of costs
when attorney-executors are paid full commissions and legal fees for
duties that sometimes overlap. Since many clients could be expected
to balk at authorizing a full commission if a half-commission was the
statutory standard, its bill sought to discourage attorneys from taking
dual roles by reducing the financial incentive. 53
The New York proposal:
took a middle course between recent statutes enacted in other states.
California was more stringent on attorney-executors, allowing them a
full commission but no legal fees without prior court approval. At the
other extreme, Florida allows them full commissions and attorney's

147. Spencer, supra note 143.
148. Spencer, supranote 143.
149. Spencer, supranote 143.
150. Gary Spencer, Bill Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees on Estate Work, N.Y. L.J.,

June 21, 1995, at 1.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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fees, which consist of regular hourly rates plus 1 to 2 percent of estate
assets. 154
The New York law applied to wills executed after January 1, 1996, and
decedents dying after December 31, 1996, regardless of when their will was
executed.-'
The opponents of completely eliminating any chance of "double dipping"
without court approval prevailed inNew York, unlike in California. The recent
New York law was designed to address situations:
where the client may think or presume that naming his or her attorney
as executor will reduce the commissions and/or legal fees charged to
the estate. In the past, lawyers who failed to address this issue in the
will drafting process were open to criticism by disgruntled heirs or the
56

courts.

The statute only applies to lawyers who actually draft the will in which they are
named executor and does not apply to the trustees of inter vivos (revocable or
irrevocable) or testamentary trusts-thus, perhaps, "serv[ing] to encourage [the]
increased use ofrevocable inter-vivos trusts." 11 The New York legislation that
finally passed was, in essence, a disclosure statute-it did not prohibit "doubledipping," it merely required that the lawyer disclose this possibility and the right
of the client to negotiate a fee prior to death. It keeps with the spirit ofthe Ethics
2000 proposal regarding the lawyer "advising the client concerning the nature
and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment."'
Presumably, each of these new statutory schemes will discourage lawyers
from taking on the role of fiduciary simply for monetary gain. The California
approach will do much more in this regard, but both are useful efforts at limiting
the number of lawyer/fiduciaries to those cases in which the client needs the
lawyer's particular expertise.""

154. Id.
155. Id. The bill, N.Y. Senate No. 3195-A, became N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT
LAw § 2307-a (McKinney 1997). Spencer, supra note 150.
156. Gerald I. Carp & Sanford J. Schlesinger, Disclosure Requirements for
Attorney Serving as Executor,N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1995, at 1.
157. Id.
158. ABA Report, supranote 5.
159. For a review of how courts have implemented Section 2307-a in New York,
see Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, RehashingDisclosureRequirementsofAttorney Fiduciaries,
N.Y. L.J., June 15, 2001, at 3. Note also that the California legislation also invalidated
gifts to drafting attorneys and facilitated the removal of drafting attorneys who named
themselves as the soletrustee ofatrust. CAL.PROB. CODE §§ 15642,21355 (West 2000).
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A. Deterrence,Detection, and Compensation
In addition to the ethical reforms suggested in the last Part and the
procedural reforms outlined in this one, the legal profession can do much more
to prevent the cases of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct that may result from a
drafting attorney naming himself or herself as a sole, unsupervised fiduciary.
The inherent conflicts may make such eventual misconduct more likely."6 These
first group of reforms: (1) deter lawyers from abusing their fiduciary duty; (2)
detect lawyers who are doing so earlier; and (3) increase the amount of
compensation available to victims of these lawyers. The second group of
suggested reforms aims to improve the quality of the actors and the institutions
in the system through better training of lawyers and judges and by increasing the
resources available to probate courts.
The first group of reforms is directed at increasing
deterrence-discouraging lawyer/fiduciaries from engaging in misconduct in the
first place. The ethical and procedural reforms discussed previously should go
a long way toward deterrence; if the lawyer has a clear ethical guideline and
knows that there may be mandatory supervision of his or her actions, lawyers
bent on misconduct may avoid the role of fiduciary. In addition, increasing the
frequency of bar disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecutions will have
a deterrent effect on such lawyers. This may be more effective than increasing
the severity of the punishment in the cases in which lawyers are caught. Harsher
penalties may be disregarded by lawyers inclined to misconduct because such
lawyers seem to gauge the risk of being caught as low. Increasing the chances
of being punished may do far more to deter them from such behavior than
strengthening the penalties received by the few lawyers who are disciplined or
prosecuted.
In addition to punishing lawyers, more pervasive efforts to intervene in
cases in which lawyers are substance abusers or demonstrate addictive behavior
will have a deterrent effect on lawyers. Increasing the funding for effective
lawyer assistance programs will help identify problem lawyers early, and
encouraging other lawyers to suggest that their colleagues in need seek help to

These changes were aimed at preventing another "Gunderson" scenario from happening
in the future. See Conservatorship of Bryant v. Brown, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 762 (Ct.
App. 1996) ("The report of [James] Gunderson's self-dealing and extensive fraud was
the catalyst for Assemblyman Umberg to introduce Assembly Bill No. 21, December 7,
1992.... Assemblyman Umberg's office stated 'the primary purpose of A.B. 21 is to
strictly forbid attorneys from drafting (or causing to be drafted) wills that leave
themselves, or relatives or business partners, any gifts."').
160. The Author admittedly does not have empirical evidence of this proposition
but anecdotal evidence suggests embezzlement and similar behavior is certainly
facilitated if the drafting attorney is also the sole fiduciary.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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get the problem under control would all go a long way toward preventing cases
of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct.'
Getting lawyers to report misconduct by other lawyers will increase
deterrence, as well as detection. 62 In many cases of lawyer/fiduciary
misconduct, there are other lawyers who suspected or outright knew that the
lawyer/fiduciary was engaging in misconduct but did not comply with their
ethical obligations to report that behavior to the bench or bar. Improving
enforcement of the whistle blower rules under the Model Rules will help courts
identify these cases earlier. If such lawyers know their colleagues are likely to
blow the whistle, it will deter at least some of them from engaging in the conduct
in the first place.
Random audits by the bench and bar are another mechanism for improving
the detection of misconduct by lawyer/fiduciaries.'63 The Virginia Bar
Commission recommended random audits after one high-profile case in the
state. 1" Random audits have proven effective in ferreting out misconduct not
only in probate matters but also in lawyer thefts from client security funds. New
York has had some luck with its "bounced check" rule that flags lawyers who
65
write bad checks from client trust accounts.

161. See generallyRick B. Allan, Alcoholism, DrugAbuse andLawyers: Are We
Ready to Address the Denial?,31 CREIGirroN L. REV. 265 (1997).

162. See In reHimmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (an attorney was disciplined for
failing to report the unethical behavior of another attorney). But see In re Ethics
Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 318-19 (R.I. 1993), cited in ACTEC
COMMENTARIES, supranote 91, at 147-48, which stated:
A lawyer to whom former lawyer for client confessed embezzlement from
client may not report misconduct by former lawyer without client's consent.
The information was learned during the course of representing the client,

which is within the scope of Rhode Island version of [Model Rules of
Professional Conduct] Rule 1.6 .... The Advisory Panel asks the Supreme
Court Committee to study the rules... and to consider amending Rhode

Island's version of Rule 1.6 to deal with this type of anomalous situation.
163. Some participants in the UTC Symposium would embrace the ethical reforms

purported above combined with random audits and improvements in the post-facto
remedies, like client protection funds, as sufficient measures to address the problem of
drafting attorneys. They wouldnot endorse the procedural changes to the UPC and UTC
suggested above because they move in a more interventionist direction-contrary to the
underlying philosophy of the Model Codes. The Author feels that the procedural reforms

are also necessary to give teeth to the ethical rules and can be made with little cost to the
overall non-interventionist principle of the UPC and UTC.
164. Special Committee on Lawyers Serving as Fiduciaries, Report to the Council
ofthe Virginia State Bar,Recommendationsin Favorof a ProgramofRandom Reviews
(June 1, 1993) (available from the Virginia State Bar).
165. Jill Schachner Chanen, Keeping a Lid on Illegal Takings: Commonsense
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In addition to random audits, making accounts mandatory will help increase
detection of lawyer malfeasance. More importantly, improving the courts' and
beneficiaries' ability to review these accounts, as well as quick penalties for
failure to file them on time, are essential to improving the chances of identifying
and stopping lawyer/fiduciary misconduct in its tracks. The rise of the Internet
offers the resources needed to facilitate these kinds of reforms. Probate records
and accounts now can be made available on-line, with less expense, and
computerization of records, in general, will make it easier for both court
personnel and beneficiaries to monitor fiduciary behavior as it occurs.
No system is perfect, and, even if all of these reforms were implemented,
there would be cases that slip through the cracks. Thus, there is a crying need
for a better safety net or system of compensation for the victims of
lawyer/fiduciaries whose behavior causes damage to their clients or their heirs
and beneficiaries. There are three areas that can be strengthened to accomplish
this result. The first of these is ensuring that lawyer/fiduciaries post bond. The
second is adequate funding of state client protection funds." These are sorely
in need of more funding if they are to be serious mechanisms for compensating
the victims of intentional misconduct on the part of lawyer/fiduciaries. In many
cases of lawyer/fiduciary misconduct, the state client protection fund has fallen
far short of fully compensating the needy victims of lawyer malfeasance.
The third and final element of a viable safety net for the victims of
lawyer/fiduciary misconduct is to consider implementing mandatory malpractice
or fiduciary insurance as a condition of being a licensed attorney or
attomey/fiduciary. While intentional misconduct is often excluded from such
policies, other misconduct of a lawyer/fiduciary is often covered. The legal
profession, as a whole, would do well to consider following the example of
Oregon and of foreign countries that require lawyers to have some coverage in
the event of malpractice. 67 The American public-if it fully understood the

ProceduresCan Keep Employees' Hands out of the Cookie Jar,85 A.B.A. J. 74, 75

(June 1999) ('Twenty-six states now have mandatory overdraft protection for client trust
accounts. Banks are required to notify the state lawyer disciplinary agency when those
accounts are overdrawn.").
166. See generallyHarriet L. Tumey & John A. Holtaway, ClientProtectionFunds
-Lawyers Put Their Money Where Their Mouths Are, 9 PROF. LAW. 18 (Feb. 1998).
167. Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession'sDirtyLittle Secret,
47 VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1726 (1994). The Illinois State Bar Association is also planning

to send a recommendation to the Illinois Supreme Court to ask that the court implement
a mandatory malpractice insurance rule like Oregon has. Molly McDonough, Pushfor
MandatoryCoverage: IllinoisBar Wants to Make MalpracticeInsurancethe Law, ABA
J. EREPORT, Jan. 11, 2002. Note that many other countries mandate minimum limits for

professional liability insurance as a condition of practicing law. According to studies
conducted in 1995, England, France, Germany, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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Sweden, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec were among the countries, along with
Canadian provinces, that required some form of malpractice insurance. LIABILITY OF
LAWYERS AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE 75 (Albert Rogers et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter

LIABILITY OF LAWYERS]. Solicitors in England were required to carry at least the
equivalent of $1.5 million in insurance. Id. at 118. This coverage derives from solicitor
taxes that are paid into the Solicitors' Compensation Fund maintained by the Law
Society. Id. at 114.
In France, attorneys were required by law (Law no. 71-1130) to carry the equivalent
of at least $400,000 in insurance. Id. at 127. Certain bars, such as the Paris Bar, have
insurance policies that their members must purchase; other bars allow attorneys to select
their own policies. Id. In 1995, when malpractice claims against attorneys were on the
rise, the bar councils were considering a country-wide system with uniform insurance
requirements depending on firm size. Id.
German attorneys were required by the BRAO (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung)to
carry at least the equivalent of $375,000 in insurance with an aggregate no lower than
$1,428,000. Id. at 131. Attorneys are also "obliged to render proof to the local bar that
[they are] properly insured." Id.
For most states in Australia, the amount of malpractice insurance required was the
equivalent of $820,600 per claim, which can be purchased using the Australian legal
profession's malpractice insurance plans. Id. at 77-78.
"The Belgian Bars take out collective insurance policies for theirmembers" and pay
the insurance premiums with part of the attorneys' annual bar dues. Id. at 84. The bar
policies provide coverage up to the equivalent of $500,000 for contractual claims, up to
the equivalent of $8 million for "bodily damage," and up to the equivalent of $800,000
for "other damage." Id.
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Bar Association "is charged with ensuring a
guarantee to the public that each lawyer has made adequate provision to meet claims
arising from his professional liability." LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE
SURVEY OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER
PRACTICE OF LAW 116 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW WITHOUT

FRONTIERS]. Though the Bar does not offer an insurance plan, attorneys must obtain
malpractice policies providing coverage for at least the equivalent of $570,000 per claim
with an aggregate of the equivalent of $1.1 million. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra,at

171-72.
Attorneys in Sweden were required to carry insurance in an amount equivalent to
$415,000 per claim. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 226. Bar dues are used for the
Swedish Bar Association's insurance plan for its members. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS,

supra,at 226.
In British Columbia, Canada, both a statute and the Law Society require that
attorneys carry malpractice insurance in an amount equivalent to $1 million per claim.
LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 189. Attorneys pay an annual fee to the Law

Society's insurance plan. If an attorney does not pay the fee and is uninsured, the
attorney "is prohibited from practicing law until the fee is paid." LAW WITHOUT
FRONTIERS, supra, at 189.

The Law Societyin Ontario, Canada, has a malpractice insurance plan that provides
coverage up to the required amount for attorneys, which is the equivalent of $736,700.
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situation-would be justifiably angry that lawyers who must obtain a license
from the state to practice law, and, thus, have a monopoly on providing those
services, do not have a concomitant obligation to ensure there is insurance
available to compensate the victims of their negligence. Short of mandatory
malpractice for all attorneys, or mandatory disclosure that an attorney does not
carry malpractice insurance, 68 lawyer/fiduciaries should be required to carry
"liability insurance in an appropriate amount for the purposes of protecting the
estate, trust or other account and its beneficiaries from any misappropriation or
misapplication of fiduciary funds or other insurable loss."69
B. Improving the Actors and the Institutions
The central actors in the probate process-lawyers-are run through a
rigorous, three-year post-graduate education. This education suffers from a
number of systemic flaws that should be addressed in order to produce lawyers
better suited to taking on the mantle of fiduciary. More specific curricular focus
on those skills needed to be an effective and honest fiduciary, as well as more

attention to the alternative kind of judgment that fiduciaries must exercise, as
opposed to that used by lawyer/advocates, would go a long way toward

improving service to the those clients who choose to name lawyers as their
fiduciaries. 70

LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 93. Attorneys pay an annual fee that is used for
insurance purposes. LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra, at 172.
Attorneys in Quebec, Canada, are required by statute to carry malpractice insurance
with the Quebec Bar Insurance Fund, unless their practice "does not represent a risk to
the public." LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 95. The plan's coverage totals about the
equivalent of $720,000 per claim. LIABILITY OF LAWYERS, supra, at 95.

168. "The ABA's Standing Committee on Client Protection, which once promoted
making malpractice insurance mandatory, is now proposing a new Model Rule based on
the South Dakota Model." Mark Hansen, Under Covered: Proponents Say Fewer
Lawyers Will Go BareIfForcedto Disclose TheirInsuranceStatus, 87 A.B.A. J. 46, 47

(Nov. 2001). South Dakota (as well as Ohio and Alaska) mandates that lawyers must
disclose to their clients the fact that they do not carry malpractice insurance. See
McDonough, supra note 167.
169. See Cook, supra note 95.

170. The Fordham Conference Working Group concluded its recommendations
with the following final component: "Lawyers should be trained in the social sciences
relative to older persons. Thus, programs that will educate lawyers representing older

persons in the range of social sciences as they affect older persons should be developed
with a focus on the decision-making capacity of older persons." Recommendations of
the Conference,supra note 10, at 1001; see also Monopoli, supra note 15 (laying out

new curricular paradigm for training law students to be more conscious of and skilled in
the lawyer's role as fiduciary in addition to that of zealous litigator).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/6
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Improvements in the training ofprobatejudges and the development oftheir
professional and managerial skills would help minimize the chances for
cronyism and mismanagement of cases that result in lawyer/fiduciary
misconduct going undetected or unaddressed by the courts for months and
years.17 t State budgets should include increased funding to improve judicial
education, as well as to enhance the courts themselves through the addition of
probate staff, the implementation of computerized records, and the more rapid
movement of cases through the system.
Finally, but not unimportantly, is the education ofconsumers ofprobate and
trust services. The bar should resist efforts to minimize the amount of
information on the wealth transfer system that is available to consumers. 2 The
Internet and related technological advances will help develop more sophisticated
clients and beneficiaries. In the end, that is the most effective defense against
a lawyer/fiduciary who is engagedin misconduct. It is also a critical element in
improving the overall reputation of the bench and bar in this country-a goal all
members of the profession should share.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is little question that lawyers will continue to be appointed as
fiduciaries given the graying of the American population, the mobility of
American families, and the transfer of trillions of dollars in wealth from the
World War II generation to their Baby Boom offspring. There always will be
clients without family or friends to take on the role of administering and
distributing their estates or managing their assets. Given the transformation of
the banking industry and the reduction in the number of trst departments that
offer personal service, lawyers are well-positioned to fill this gap. They should
be encouraged and trained to become competent, ethical fiduciaries. 73 As
United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankftrter said:
[Lawyers act] in defense of right and to ward off wrong. From a
profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted
those qualities of truth speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that

171. The National College of Probate Judges is an organization dedicated to
improving the training and professionalism of probate judges and probate courts. The
organization's home page is http://www.ncpj.dni.us/NCPJ/.
172. See, e.g., Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm'n v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179
F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
173. The Author thanks Professor John Langbein for his insights on this issue
during the UTC Symposium on February 15, 2002.
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have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as
moral character.' 74
With a clear ethical framework and substantive procedural reform,
lawyer/fiduciaries will be able to serve the American public well, while adhering
to the high standards articulated by Justice Frankfurter.

174. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs ofthe State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232,247 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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